Devlet Dışı Aktörlerin Gölge Orduları: Özel Askeri Şirketlerin Hibrit Savaş Stratejilerindeki Yeri

Abstract

Bu çalışma, özel askeri şirketlerin hibrit savaş stratejilerindeki rolünü Wagner Grubu’nun Afrika operasyonları üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Makale, devletlerin hibrit savaş kapasitelerini genişletmek için özel askeri şirketleri nasıl kullandığını ve bu yapıların uluslararası hukukun hangi açıklarını istismar ettiğini araştırmaktadır. Mali ve Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti vaka analizleri üzerinden, Wagner Grubu’nun askeri operasyonları bilgi savaşı ile entegre ederek hibrit savaşın prototip modelini oluşturduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Araştırma, özel askeri şirketlerin devletlere “makul inkâr edilebilirlik” avantajı sağlayarak geleneksel güvenlik paradigmalarını dönüştürdüğünü göstermektedir.

Keywords

• Hibrit Savaş
• Özel Askeri Şirketler
• Wagner Grubu
• Afrika
• Makul İnkâr Edilebilirlik

Shadow Armies of Non-State Actors: The Role of Private Military Companies in Hybrid Warfare Strategies

Abstract

This study examines the role of private military companies in hybrid warfare strategies, using the Wagner Group's operations in Africa as a case study. The article discusses how states use private military companies to expand their hybrid warfare capabilities and how these structures exploit loopholes in international law. Through case studies in Mali and the Central African Republic, it was concluded that the Wagner Group has created a prototype model of hybrid warfare by integrating its military operations with information warfare. The research shows that private military companies transform traditional security paradigms by providing states with the advantage of “plausible deniability.”

Keywords

• Hybrid Warfare
• Private Military Companies
• Wagner Group
• Africa
• Plausible Deniability

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