Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Abd’nin Orta Asya Politikası: Beklentiler Ve Gerçeklikler

Abstract

Keywords

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SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASINDA ABD’NİN ORTA ASYA POLİTİKASI: BEKLENTİLER VE GERÇEKLİKLER

Abstract

Orta Asya Soğuk Savaş döneminde Amerikan dış politikası açısından hayati öneme sahip bir bölge olarak addedilmemişti. SSCB’nin dağılmasının ardındansa, Orta Asya’ya yönelik Amerikan angajmanı başlamakla beraber, bölge ilk dönemde Washington açısından Orta Doğu gibi hayati çıkarların bulunduğu stratejik bir bölge olarak değerlendirilmemişti. 11 Eylül saldırıları öncesinde bölge, Amerikan karar vericileri açısından 1990’ların ilk yarısında SSCB’den arta kalan nükleer kapasiteler nedeniyle, 1990’ların ortalarında özellikle Hazar havzasındaki enerji kaynaklarının yeniden keşfedilmesiyle ve 1990’ların sonundaysa demokrasi ve insan hakları ihlalleri gibi konularla dikkati çekmişti. Ancak 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında yürütülen uluslararası terörizmle savaş doğrultusunda Orta Asya’nın stratejik önemi giderek artmaya başlamış ve bölgede Amerikan askeri üsleri kurulmuştur. Bir diğer ifadeyle 1990’lı yıllarda temel olarak Amerikan ticari çıkarlarının korunması ve enerji güvenliğinin sağlanması şeklinde ortaya çıkan ABD’nin Orta Asya politikası, 2000’li yıllara gelindiğinde güvenlik unsurunun daha ön planda olduğu bir içerik kazanmıştır.

Keywords

• ABD’nin Orta Asya politikası, Amerikan dış politikası, Orta Asya, üstünlük politikası, 11 Eylül saldırıları

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