MALİ KURALLAR VE TEORİK TEMELLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME

Yıl 2017, Cilt: 17 Sayı: 2, 53 - 81, 30.06.2017

İrem Çetin

Öz

Borçlanma ve bütçe açıklarındaki keskin artışlar kamu maliyesinin sürdürülebilirliği konusundaki endişeleri arttırmış, pek çok ülkede mali kurallar bu soruna çözüm olarak uygulamaya konmuştur Literatürde, ihtiyari politikanın neden olacağı borçlanma ve bütçe açığı eğilimi ile zaman tutarsızlığı, kurala dayalı politikanın ihtiyari politikaya göre daha etkin olmasının nedeni olarak ifade edilmektedir. Bu noktada, hükümetlerin borçlanma ve bütçe açığı eğiliminin anlaşılmasında ekonomi ve politika arasındaki ilişkin dikkatle incelenmesi ve analizi önem taşımaktadır. Bu inceleme, mali kuralların teorik temellerinin anlaşılmasına yardımcı olacağı gibi mali sürdürülebilirlik açısından da mali kuralların etkinliğinin analizine imkan verecektir.
Bu çerçevede, çalışmanın amacı, pek çok ülkede kamu maliyesinin sürdürülebilirliği konusundaki sorunlara çözüm olarak uygulamaya konan mali kuralların gelişiminin, rasyonalitesinin ve teorik temellerinin politika ve ekonomi arasındaki ilişki üzerinden ortaya konulmasıdır. Çalışmada, kurala dayalı maliye politikasının teorik nedenlerinin politik makroekonomi modelleri çerçevesinde ele alınmasıyla, mali kural alanında gerçekleştirilecek olan teorik ve ampirik çalışmalara katkı sağlanacağı düşünülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kurala Dayalı Maliye Politikası, Borçlanma ve Bütçe Açığı Eğilimi, Zaman Tutarsızlığı.

Kaynakça

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