The Possibility and Limits of Interpreting the Nass in the Basis of Wisdom

Abstract

The Islamic jurists state that Hikmah means “the reason for the commandment” (maqasid al-Shari’a) or “the advantage intended with the commandment” (mesalih-il-ibad).
There are two aspects of Hikmah for the commander and the commandant. In this context, the five essentials that Islam aims to safeguard, well-known as the term of “maqasid al-Shari’a” in literature can be formulated as “the protection of life, property, offspring, religion and mind”. In one respect, these principles constitute the Commander’s overall aim and involve the public welfare in another respect.
They acknowledge that the practical area can be enlarged through Qiyas and pronounce that it will be made in accordance with the suitable quality for the command. These scholars typically describe the cause (illat) as “the meaning reasonably given to the intention of commandment”.
The cause in Islam is, for example, traveling in the avoidance of fasting during Ramadan, purchase-sell contract for the transfer of ownership, or intentional manslaughter for the punishment of retaliation.
The term of hikmah is used as the following meaning:
a.    The expedient case for the commandment (e.g. hardship in traveling, requirement for such a trade agreement, or loss of life in manslaughter)
b.    The intentional outcomes through the commandment, or the wilful interest to be protected (e.g. overcoming the hardship with permission of avoiding fast of Ramadan during travel, providing the interests and meeting the necessities of the contracting parties in rendering the exchange permissible (jaiz), or preventing loss of life by way of prohibiting wilful murder and punishing the murderer who has violated the cannon law.
In this context the cause is answering the question asked to reveal the association and determination between the command and the action, while hikmah is the reply to what aim the Commander has got in establishing commandments.
Consequently, it will be evidently more useful that the Islamic rules (nass) essential for Qiyas should not only be perceived with the cause but also interpreted within integrity of hikmah considering the reasons behind the rules. For example, the judgment of “the cause of illicitness is intoxication and any toxicants are illicit” has been made through Qiyas method from the verse of unlawfulness of alcoholic beverages, and to interpret it together with the phrases in the end of the verse and the following verse: “…The Shaitan only desires to cause enmity and hatred to spring in your midst by means of intoxicants and games of chance…”, the circumstances to incite hatred and enmity can also be grounded on in norm making so that hikmah involves considering the potential outcomes.
For ratiocination of the commandments in a way of hikmah, the great majority of Islamic jurists confirms that there exist some absolute reasons laying behind the divine commandments, and the most of these rules are ratiocinable. These reasons are mainly based on the principle of providing benefits for the sake of people and purifying the world by getting rid of harms from them. These primary goals of the Commander’s are the key analytical tools in understanding and applying the Islamic norms as well as deducing judgments in lack of applicable norms.
Technically with the cause-centered Qiyas, is it possible to apply a hikmah-oriented approach requiring the consideration of the potential outcomes? In this paper, its applicability will be discussed.
The Prophet (his holiness) prohibited the action in which a woman is under the same marriage with her aunt (the sister of her father or mother) and highlighted the adverse consequences saying like “That is why you will broken the family bonds if you do so”.
Furthermore, the Prophet (his holiness) pronounced to Mughira bin Shuba who expressed his opinion of marriage with a woman, like “Look at her because doing so is such a proper action that affection and fondness can occur between both of you”. The Allah’s Messenger (Rasulullah, peace be upon him) gives permission that a man may look at his prospective woman and indicates that this may allow for the couple to love and get along with each other. Therefore, this is of hikmah because it achieves the advantages of worshippers.
In our topic, the more explanatory example is: the Prophet (his holiness) said “Hands are not to be cut off during a war (no haad penalty would be enforced to a thief)”. The hikmah of the restriction in this hadith is related to the would-be damage when the penalty is performed, according to sahaba and tabiun, and it is disadvantagous outcomes such as the criminal’s defection. Afterwards they judged this forbidden for other haad penalties determined in sharia including adultery penalty and wining penalty because the execution of all these punishments in war may also lead to the mentioned adverse outcomes. Then, they transformed this into a general principle that the haads/severe penalties will not be executed in the enemy country in consideration of avoiding a damaging consequence such as defection to the foe and hence its empowerment.
Accordingly Abu Hanifa said “I find it inappropriate that nobody man or woman who has expelled from an enemy country and captured by Muslims is sold to a country at enmity with Muslims so that the enemies will strengthen by this means” judging with the Qiyas based on the same hikmah and pointed out potential disadvantages from such a business. It can be inferred that he must have reached this judment through Qiyas on the basis of the hikmah in that hadith of the Prophet’s (his holiness). Consequently all these cases show us that a hikmah oriented Qiyas is possible from its practice in the early periods.
Such a teleological interpretation had major part in the disposition of the Caliph Omar (his holiness) on the Iraqi lands. In this case, he did not distribute them among the war veterans but leave the estates to the previous owners, and this application is based on the long-term hikmah acting thoughtfully for next offspring as well as concern for public interest. His disposition would be the source of inspiration for further developments and serve as an example for the establishment of demesne system in the Ottoman State.
After all, it is likely to be useful that the underlying Islamic nass (inconvertible cannon laws) for Qiyas is not realized simply around the cause but also interpreted with integrity of hikmah.
In conclusion, hikmah is a key criterion for interpretation that can be used in terms of whether the specific purposes for the commands is juristically achieved or not.

Keywords

• Islamic Jurisprudence,Hikmah,Teleological Interpretation,Ratiocination of the Commandments,Maslaha

Hikmet Ekseninde Nassların Yorumlanma İmkânı ve Sınırları

Abstract

Alîm olan ve kemal ilmiyle kullarının dinî ve dünyevî maslahatlarını en iyi bilen yüce Allah, hakîm olarak onlarla ilgili koyduğu hükümlerde de en ince hikmeti gözetmiştir. Yüce Allah hikmeti gereği, kullarının maslahatlarını hem maddî hem de manevî; hem bu dünyaya ‘âcile dönük hem de uzun vadeye/ ahirete dönük olarak gözetmiştir. İstikrâ/ tümevarım metoduyla incelendiğinde söz konusu gâî hikmetin Kur’an ve Sünnette yer alan nasslarda da gözetildiği görülür. Nassların sınırlı olayların sınırsız olduğu düşünüldüğünde Müslümanların karşılaştığı yeni meselelerde vahiyle olgu arasında sağlıklı bir bağ kurulabilmesi bu hikmetin gözetilmesiyle mümkündür. İslam Hukuku geleneği içerisinde ilk üç asır hariç diğer zamanlarda nasslarla olgu arasında hikmet eksenli bu bağın kurulduğunu söylemek (bazı müçtehitler istisna edilirse ) güç gözüküyor. Zira naslarla ilgili yapılan yorum ve istidlaller daha çok literal nitelikli olmuştur. Kıyas yolu ile illet benzerliğinden hareketle hükmü nasslarda açıklanmış bir meselenin hükmünü, hükmü bilinmeyen meselelere de tadiye ederek hükmü genişletme şeklindeki bir içtihat yöntemi olan kıyasta, hukuk istikrârının korunması adına hükümler illet üzerine bina edilmiş ve hikmet çoğu zaman göz ardı edilmiştir. Kıyasta ta’lilin neye göre yapılacağı bağlamında illet mi? Hikmet mi? Sorusunda söz konusu edilen hikmet daha dar anlamlıdır. Çünkü burada hikmet kıyas konusu olayın özelinde cereyan eder. Biz araştırmamızda sadece bunu konu edinmiyoruz. Bilakis geniş anlamda yani hükmün konulmasında hedeflenen sonuç ya da korunmak istenen maslahat anlamındaki hikmeti merkeze alıyoruz. Neticede iki hususa cevap arıyoruz 1.Nassların yorumlanmasında gözetilen bu gâi hikmetin sınırları nedir. 2.Doğabilecek sonuçların dikkate alınması anlamında “hikmeti” önceleyen bir gâî yorum geliştirilerek günümüzde ortaya çıkan problemlerin çözümüne katkı sağlamak mümkün mü? Makalede bu sorular somut örnekler üzerinden tartışılmaktadır.

Keywords

• İslam Hukuku,Hikmet,Gâi Yorum,Hükümlerin Ta’lîli,Maslahat

References

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