Research Article

“Moral Awareness” as an Adequate Idea in Spinoza’s Ethics: Conscious or Conscience?

Volume: 26 Number: 3 December 15, 2022
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“Moral Awareness” as an Adequate Idea in Spinoza’s Ethics: Conscious or Conscience?

Abstract

As in classical Latin philosophical and theological texts, Spinoza did not make any semantic distinction between the concepts of conscientia and conscius, and used one interchangeably. But the concept of conscientia is used as an “inner voice” or “conscience” meaning “moral sensitivity” or “moral awareness” and expresses both rational and irrational processes in traditioanl philosophy. On the other hand, the concept of conscius is used in the sense of “consciousness” and expresses a mental or psychological reflexive activity based on rational processes in the same tradition. Based on Spinoza's use of the two concepts in the same sense, this study claims that “moral sensitivity” is formed as a result of reflexive thinking, which is a mental action. Where consciousness is understood as a reflexive activity based on the relationship between ideas, it is argued that “moral awareness” occurs in the mind as an idea formed as a result of the relationship between ideas. In the study, it is determined that Spinoza developed a kind of “moral consciousness” theory based on the awareness in question, rather than a “conscience theory”. The main focus of the study is that the idea of “good” and “evil”, which are the basic concepts in Spinoza’s ethics, arise from the idea of “joy” and “sadness” that occur as emotions in the mind. Here, “joy” or “sadness” is considered as the primary ideas that occur in the mind as a result of the affection of the body, and “good” or “bad” as secondary ideas formed by the mind as a result of contemplation on these primary ideas. In the article, the theory of “moral consciousness” is based on the “ideas of ideas”, which are the secondary ideas in question. Keywords: Consciousness, Conscience, Awareness, Moral Consciousness, Good-Evil, Joy-Sadness.

Keywords

References

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Details

Primary Language

Turkish

Subjects

Religious Studies

Journal Section

Research Article

Publication Date

December 15, 2022

Submission Date

July 30, 2022

Acceptance Date

December 4, 2022

Published in Issue

Year 1970 Volume: 26 Number: 3

ISNAD
Dağ, Enes. “Spinoza Etiğinde Upuygun Bir Fikir Olarak ‘Ahlaki Farkındalık’: Bilinç Mi, Vicdan Mı?”. Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi 26/3 (December 1, 2022): 1181-1196. https://doi.org/10.18505/cuid.1150883.

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