Hume's Response to Mind-Body Problem
Abstract
: The mind-body problem concerns Descartes’ question of how material things can cause something completely different in nature: sensations, ideas or mental experiences. Hume does not confront this puzzle head on and never worries about the problem of causation between mental and physical. He nonetheless emphasizes this Cartesian puzzle in terms of representation: how something mental can be about things that are completely different in nature? How perceptions can represent external bodies? His answer is that this is Locke’s double existence view, according to which, there is an external reality behind the “veil of perceptions”. In his words, this view is “the monstrous offspring of the modern philosophy”. I argue that Hume holds that there are only perceptions, which are neither mental nor physical and that minds and bodies are constructions out of such neutral perceptions. This brings him close to Spinoza’s view according to which mind-body distinction is a conceptual rather than a real distinction.
Keywords
References
- Bennett, Jonathan (1971). Locke, Berkeley and Hume: Central Themes. Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, David (2015). “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: 246–276.
- Descartes, René (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy and Replies and Objections, in CSM 2:3-385.
- Descartes, René (1644). Principles of Philosophy, in CSM 1: 179-404.
- Descartes, René (1649). The Passions of the Soul, S. Voss edition (Indianapolis:Hacket, 1989).
- Hume, David (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford University Press 1964.
- Nagel, Thomas (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pears, David (1990). Hume’s System. Oxford University Press.
Details
Primary Language
English
Subjects
-
Journal Section
Research Article
Authors
Sun Demirli
*
Türkiye
Publication Date
May 9, 2019
Submission Date
February 8, 2019
Acceptance Date
February 25, 2019
Published in Issue
Year 2019 Volume: 6 Number: 1