Abstract
: The mind-body problem concerns Descartes’ question of how material things can cause something completely different in nature: sensations, ideas or mental experiences. Hume does not confront this puzzle head on and never worries about the problem of causation between mental and physical. He nonetheless emphasizes this Cartesian puzzle in terms of representation: how something mental can be about things that are completely different in nature? How perceptions can represent external bodies? His answer is that this is Locke’s double existence view, according to which, there is an external reality behind the “veil of perceptions”. In his words, this view is “the monstrous offspring of the modern philosophy”. I argue that Hume holds that there are only perceptions, which are neither mental nor physical and that minds and bodies are constructions out of such neutral perceptions. This brings him close to Spinoza’s view according to which mind-body distinction is a conceptual rather than a real distinction.
References
- Bennett, Jonathan (1971). Locke, Berkeley and Hume: Central Themes. Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, David (2015). “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: 246–276.
- Descartes, René (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy and Replies and Objections, in CSM 2:3-385.
- Descartes, René (1644). Principles of Philosophy, in CSM 1: 179-404.
- Descartes, René (1649). The Passions of the Soul, S. Voss edition (Indianapolis:Hacket, 1989).
- Hume, David (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford University Press 1964.
- Nagel, Thomas (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pears, David (1990). Hume’s System. Oxford University Press.
- Price, H. H. (1940). Hume's Theory of External Physical World. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Russell, Bertrand (1921). The Analysis of Mind, Reprinted: London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978.
- Spinoza, Benedict (1661). Ethics Demonstrated in a Geometrical Order, in CS 408-617.
- Thorpe, Lucas (2010). “Is Kant’s Realm of Ends a Unum per Se? Aquinas, Suárez, Leibniz and Kant on Composition.” British Journal of the History of Philosophy, 18(3) 2010: 461–485.
- Thorpe, Lucas (2011).“Autonomy and Community” in Thorpe, Lucas and Payne, Charlton (eds.) Kant and the Concept of Community, A North American Kant Society Special Volume, University of Rochester Press.
- Voss, Stephen (1994). The End of Anthropology, in Cottingham 1994: 273-306.
- Wilson, Fred. (1988). "Was Hume a Subjectivist". Philosophy Research Archives, 14.
- Wright, John (1983). The Sceptical Realism of David Hume. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Abstract
Descartes,
zihin-beden problemini tartışırken, fiziksel bir varlık olarak bedenin nasıl
olupta kendisinden tamamen farklı bir doğaya sahip olan zihin üzerinde, algı,
his, düşünce, ve benzer zihinsel olgulara neden olabileceğini sorguluyordu.
Hume, zihin ve beden arasında bir nedensellik bağıntısı olup olamayacağını, hiç
bir yazısında tartışmadı. Buna rağmen, Descartes’ın problemini farklı bir
şekilde ele aldı: Nasıl oluyorda zihinsel içerikler dış nesneleri temsil
edebilir? Hume bu soruyu şu şekilde cevaplıyor: İde yada algı gibi zihinsel
içeriklerin, dış dünya hakkında olduğu (ve böylece dış nesneleri resmettigi)
düşüncesi, Descartes ve Locke benzeri modern felsefecilerin talihsiz bir icadı
olmalı. Bu yazıda, Hume’un algı içeriklerini, ne zihinsel ne de fiziksel
olmayan, nötr bir yapı olarak düşündüğünu, ve zihin ve bedeni, bu algı
içeriklerinden ortaya çıkan birer kurgu olarak tanımladığını savunuyorum. Bunun
sonucu olarak şöyle diyebiriz: Hume, Spinoza’yı takip ederek, zihin ve beden
arasında gerçek değil, sadece kavramsal bir fark görmektedir.
References
- Bennett, Jonathan (1971). Locke, Berkeley and Hume: Central Themes. Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, David (2015). “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: 246–276.
- Descartes, René (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy and Replies and Objections, in CSM 2:3-385.
- Descartes, René (1644). Principles of Philosophy, in CSM 1: 179-404.
- Descartes, René (1649). The Passions of the Soul, S. Voss edition (Indianapolis:Hacket, 1989).
- Hume, David (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford University Press 1964.
- Nagel, Thomas (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pears, David (1990). Hume’s System. Oxford University Press.
- Price, H. H. (1940). Hume's Theory of External Physical World. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Russell, Bertrand (1921). The Analysis of Mind, Reprinted: London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978.
- Spinoza, Benedict (1661). Ethics Demonstrated in a Geometrical Order, in CS 408-617.
- Thorpe, Lucas (2010). “Is Kant’s Realm of Ends a Unum per Se? Aquinas, Suárez, Leibniz and Kant on Composition.” British Journal of the History of Philosophy, 18(3) 2010: 461–485.
- Thorpe, Lucas (2011).“Autonomy and Community” in Thorpe, Lucas and Payne, Charlton (eds.) Kant and the Concept of Community, A North American Kant Society Special Volume, University of Rochester Press.
- Voss, Stephen (1994). The End of Anthropology, in Cottingham 1994: 273-306.
- Wilson, Fred. (1988). "Was Hume a Subjectivist". Philosophy Research Archives, 14.
- Wright, John (1983). The Sceptical Realism of David Hume. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Details
| Primary Language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal Section | Articles |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | May 9, 2019 |
| Submission Date | February 8, 2019 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2019 Volume: 6 Issue: 1 |