THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DESPONDENT ANALYSIS OF AN ALLEGEDLY EMERGING RULE OF CUSTOMARY LAW

Abstract

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) represents a landmark attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons by establishing a comprehensive prohibition framework. Immediately after its adoption, it was argued that the TPNW contributed to or facilitated the emergence of a new customary rule of international law prohibiting the possession, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This study examines whether the prohibitions set forth in Article 1 of the TPNW have attained the status of customary international law. The study addresses two main research questions by adopting a methodology based on an examination of state practice, opinio juris, and case law. First, it examines whether the prohibitions under Article 1 possess the necessary characteristics to be recognized as customary international law. Second, it evaluates the legal status of objecting states within the framework of the persistent objector rule, in the event that the prohibitions in question are recognized as customary international law or are anticipated to achieve such status in the near future. The findings of the study show that the prohibitions envisaged by the TPNW have not yet evolved into customary international law. The primary reason for this is the lack of uniform and representative state practice, particularly among nuclear-weapon states and their allies. This research aims to contribute to the doctrine by highlighting the challenges of aligning global disarmament objectives with the strategic and security concerns of nuclear-weapon states and their allies, ultimately suggesting that the normative aspirations of the TPNW remain constrained by geopolitical realities.

Keywords

• Nuclear weapons
• Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
• customary international law
• persistent objector rule
• nuclear sharing

NÜKLEER SİLAHLARIN YASAKLANMASI ANTLAŞMASI VE ULUSLARARASI HUKUK: MEMUL BİR TEAMÜL HUKUKU KURALI ÜZERİNE MEYUS BİR İNCELEME

Abstract

Nükleer Silahların Yasaklanması Antlaşması (NYSA), kapsamlı bir yasak-lama çerçevesi oluşturarak nükleer silahların ortadan kaldırılmasını hedefleyen önemli bir girişimdir. Kabulünün hemen ardından, NSYA’nın nükleer silahların bulundurulması, kullanılması veya kullanma tehdidinde bulunulmasının yasak-lanması şeklinde yeni bir teamül hukuku kuralının ortaya çıkışını sağladığı veya buna katkıda bulunduğu öne sürülmüştür. Bu çalışma, NSYA’nın 1. maddesinde yer verilen yasakların teamül hukuku statüsüne ulaşıp ulaşmadığını incelemek-tedir. Çalışma, devlet uygulaması, opinio juris ve içtihat incelemesine dayalı bir yöntem benimseyerek iki temel araştırma sorusunu ele almaktadır. İlk olarak, 1. madde kapsamındaki yasakların uluslararası teamül hukuku olarak kabul edil-mesi için gerekli özelliklere sahip olup olmadığı incelenmektedir. İkinci olarak, söz konusu yasakların teamül hukuku statüsünde olduklarının veya yakın gelecekte olacaklarının kabulü halinde, söz konusu yasaklara muhalif devletlerin hukuki durumları ısrarlı itiraz kuralı çerçevesinde değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışmanın bulguları, NSYA’nın öngördüğü yasakların henüz uluslararası teamül hukukuna dönüşmediğini göstermektedir. Bunun başlıca nedeni, özellikle nükle-er silah sahibi devletler ve müttefikleri arasında tek tip ve temsil edici bir devlet uygulamasının bulunmamasıdır. Bu araştırma, küresel silahsızlanma hedeflerini nükleer silah sahibi devletler ve müttefiklerinin stratejik ve güvenlik endişeleriyle uyumlu hale getirmenin zorluklarını vurgulayarak doktrine katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamakta ve nihayetinde NSYA’nın normatif hedeflerinin jeopolitik gerçek-lerle sınırlı kaldığını öne sürmektedir.

Keywords

• Nükleer silahlar
• Nükleer Silahların Yasaklanması Antlaşması (NSYA)
• uluslararası teamül hukuku
• ısrarlı itiraz kuralı
• nükleer paylaşım

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