Abstract
According to Aristotle, both the principle of non-contradiction can be preserved and free will can be defended in the case of future propositions. Al- Râzî thinks that Aristotle could not prove his claim. Because, the indeterminacy of the future is an epistemological indeterminacy and that is not valid in the ontological field. While defending logical fatalism, Al-Râzî has three arguments against Aristotle: According to the first argument, since truth and falsity are real qualities, their future carriers are also real. According to the second argument, free will is related to possible actions. Everything in the past and present has happened by necessity. The future are determined by the principle of both non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. According to the third argument, when the reference point is now, the future has not happened; and when the reference point is the future, what happens necessarily happens because the future turns into the present. As a result, since there is no possibility in past, present and future, there is no field of possibility in which free will is involved. All future singulars; they are determined in such a way that it is impossible for any excess, deficiency or change to occur in them.