Ters Turnuvalar

Year 2019, Volume: 19 Issue: 1, 33 - 43, 01.01.2019

Kerim Keskin

https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2019148773

Abstract

Bu makalede Clark ve Riis (1998b)’in iç içe geçmiş çoködüllü
yarışma modelinin dinamik versiyonuna iki alternatif önerilmiştir. İlk olarak,
kazananların alacağı ödüllerin sarf edilen yarışma eforları tarafından endojen
olarak belirlendiği bir model çalışılmıştır. İkinci olarak, model
genişletilerek bir sonsuz ufuk modeli elde edilmiştir. Önerilen modellerin
alt-oyun mükemmel Nash dengeleri karakterize edilmiş olup, ilgili denge
stratejileri temel alınan modeldeki denge stratejileri ile karşılaştırılmıştır.

Converse Tournaments

Abstract

This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis
(1998b)’s sequential model of nested multipleprize contests. First, we consider
winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second, we
extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with
those in the original model. 

Keywords

Converse tournaments, Nested multipleprize contests, Tullock contests, Endogenous prizes, Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

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