Çince Odası'nda Döngüsel Uslamlama

Year 2025, Issue: 82, 26 - 35, 15.12.2025

Erhan Demircioglu

https://doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1751687

Abstract

Bu makalede, John Searle’ün ünlü Çince Odası Argümanının ikna edicilikten uzak olduğunu iddia ediyorum: bu argüman, ya Searle’ün orijinal niyetine aykırı olarak, doğru programlara sahip makinelerin hakiki bilişe sahip olduğunun renkli bir illüstrasyonunu sunuyor ya da Güçlü Yapay Zeka’nın hatalı olması gerektiği konusunda ısrar etmenin ötesinde bir şey yapmıyor.

Keywords

Yapay Zeka , Çince Odası Argümanı , Sentaks , Semantik , John Searle

Begging the Question in the Chinese Room

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the Chinese Room Argument, famously offered by John Searle, is not compelling: either, contrary to Searle’s intention, it is a colorful illustration that machines with the right programs have some genuine cognition, or it does nothing more than insisting without any persuasive force that there must be something wrong with Strong Artificial Intelligence.

Keywords

Artificial Intelligence , Chinese Room Argument , Syntax , Semantics , John Searle

References

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