Ayaklanmaya Karşı Koyma ve Kontr-Terörizm İstihbaratının Konvansiyonel İstihbarat Faaliyetlerinden Farkı

Abstract

İstihbarat faaliyetlerinin, ayaklanmaya karşı koyma (AKK) ve kontr-terörizm (KT) süreçlerinin başarısına ve etkinliğine dair ayırt edici rolü, çeşitli çalışmalarda dile getirilmiş ancak bu rolün kapsamı ve icra edilen faaliyetlerin konvansiyonel istihbarat faaliyetlerine kıyasla farklılık arz ettiği noktalar kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alınmamıştır. Bununla birlikte, gerek ayaklanma süreçlerinde isyancıların benimsemiş olduğu spesifik yöntemler gerekse de terörizmden kaynaklanan tehdidin nev’i şahsına münhasır doğası, istihbarat faaliyetlerinin icrasında da çeşitli değişiklikleri ve hedef odaklı belirli düzenlemeleri zorunlu kılar. Ayaklanmalar söz konusu olduğunda, düşük-seviyeli istihbarata atfedilmesi gereken önem, istihbarat çarkında meydana gelen değişiklikler ve toplama aşamasında gerçekleştirilmesi gereken destekleyici birtakım özel faaliyetler ayırt edici unsurlar olarak tezahür eder. Benzer şekilde, terörizmin kolay hedeflere yönelik saldırı gerçekleştirme eğilimi, terörizmden kaynaklı tehdidin ivedilik arz eden doğası ve toplama faaliyetlerinin meşakkatli yapısının operasyon-istihbarat füzyonunu gerekli kılarak istihbarat çarkı nezdinde sebep olduğu çeşitli değişiklikler, konvansiyonel istihbarat faaliyetlerine kıyasla farklılık arz eder. Bu çalışma, bahse konu farklılıklara ve bu farklılıklar karşısında istihbarat bağlamında geliştirebilecek cevaplara dair bir perspektif sunarak literatüre ve pratiğe katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Keywords

• Ayaklanma
• Terörizm
• İstihbarat
• Ayaklanmaya Karşı Koyma İstihbaratı
• Kontr-Terörizm İstihbaratı.

References

1. 50 U.S. Code § 3093. (2012). Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2014-title50/USCODE-2014-title50-chap44-subchapIII-sec3093/summary
2. Aid, M. M. (2003). All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against International Terrorism. Intelligence and National Security, 18(4): 72-120.
3. AJP-3.4.4. (2016). Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN).
4. Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Little, Brown and Company.
5. Arango, C. R. (1968). Insurgent Counterintelligence. Studies in Intelligence, 12(1): 39-53.
6. Bakker, E. ve van Zuijdewijn, J. d. R. (2016). Lone Actor Terrorism: Definitional Workshop (No: 2). RUSI Occassional Papers- Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/lone-actor-terrorism-definitional-workshop
7. Byman, D. (2013). The Intelligence War on Terrorism. Intelligence and National Security, 29(6): 837-863.
8. Calvin, M. (2009). People, Partnerships and Collaboration: Understanding and Improving Intelligence in Counterinsurgency. Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies, 1(Summer 2009): 53-73.

9. Calwell, C. E. (1996). Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. University of Nebraska Press.
10. Capellan, J. A. (2018). Killing Alone: Can the Work Performance Literature Help Us Solve the Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism. Valeri, R. M. ve Borgeson K. (Ed.). Terrorism in America içinde. (ss. 175-188). Routledge.
11. Central Intelligence Agency. (2023). The Intelligence Cycle. Erişim Tarihi: 19 Mayıs 2023. https://www.cia.gov/spy-kids/parents-teachers/docs/Briefing-intelligence-cycle.pdf
12. Clark, J. R. (2007). Intelligence and national security a reference handbook. Praeger Security International.
13. Curran, K., Concannon, K. ve McKeever, S. (2007). Cyber Terrorism Attacks. Janczewski, L. J. ve Colarik A. M. (Ed.). Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism içinde. (ss. 1-7). Information Science Reference.
14. Davies, P. H. J. (2002). Ideas of intelligence: divergent national concepts and institutions. Harvard International Review, 24(3): 62-66.
15. De Smedt, P. (2008). Strategic Intelligence in Decision Making. Cagnin, C., Keenan, M., Johnston, R., Scapolo, F. ve Barre, R. (Ed.). Future-Oriented Technology Analysis: Strategic Intelligence for an Innovative Economy içinde. (ss. 89-102). Springer Publishing.
16. DeVine, M. E. (2022). Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions (No: R45175). Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf
17. Even, S. ve Granit, A. (2009). The Israeli Intelligence Community: Where To? (Hebrew) (No: 97). Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.inss.org.il/he/publication/the-israeli-intelligence-community/
18. Flynn, M. T., Juergens, R. ve Cantrell, T. L. (2008). Employing ISR SOF Best Practices. Joint Force Quarterly, 50(3): 56-61. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA496431
19. FM 3-05.301. (2003) Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
20. Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Praeger Security International.
21. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmi Yayınları Seri No: 8. (1972). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938). Genelkurmay Basımevi.
22. Gentry, J. A. ve Gordon, J. S. (2019). Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects. Georgetown University Press.
23. Gill, P. ve Phythian, M. (2012). Intelligence in an Insecure World. Polity Press.
24. Hamm, M. (2015). Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies (No: 248691), National Institute of Justice. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/lone-wolf-terrorism-america-using-knowledge-radicalization-pathways
25. Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge University Press.
26. Hunter, T. B. (2009). Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(2): 1-52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1
27. Jackson, B. A. (2007). Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a ‘Long War’: The British Experience in Northern Ireland. RAND Publications.
28. Johnson, L. K. (2010). National Security Intelligence. Johnson, L. K. (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence içinde. (ss. 3-32). Oxford University Press.
29. Karlos, V., Larcher, M. ve Solomos, G. (2018). Review on soft target/public space protection guidance. European Commission JRC Science for Policy Report. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC110885
30. Kent, S. (1965). Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Archon Books.
31. Kilcullen, D. (2009). The accidental guerrilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big one. Oxford University Press.
32. Kitson, F. (1991). Low intensity operations: Subversion, insurgency and peacekeeping. Faber and Faber.
33. Kiras, J. D. (2019). Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency. Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J. ve Johnson J. L. (Ed.). Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies içinde. (ss. 183-202). Oxford University Press.
34. Kress, M. ve Szechtman, R. (2009). Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations—A Best-Case Scenario. Operations Research, 57(3): 578-585.
35. Kydd, A. ve Walter, B. (2006). The Strategies of Terrorism. International Security, 31(1): 49-80. DOI:10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49
36. Lahoud, N., Caudill, S., Koehler-Derrick, G., Rassler, D. ve Al`Ubaydi, M. (2012). Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?. The Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbottabad_WEB_v2.pdf
37. Lowenthal, M. (2015). Intelligence: From secrets to policy (Sixth Edition). CQ Press.
38. Mack, A. J. R. (1975). Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. World Politics, 27, (2): 175-200.
39. MI5. (2023). Terrorist Methods. Erişim Tarihi: 19 Mayıs 2023. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/terrorist-methods
40. Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Başkanlığı. (2023). İstihbarat Çarkı. Erişim Tarihi: 19 Mayıs 2023. https://www.mit.gov.tr/t-cark.html
41. Moir, N. (2008). Influencing Coin Ops through PSYOP. Military Intelligence Corps Association, 13(3): 4-8.
42. Murray, R. (25 Temmuz 2018). The Unrealized Value of Open Source Intelligence for Irregular Warfare. Erişim Tarihi: 16 Mayıs 2023. https://www.realcleardefense.com/2018/07/25/the_unrealized_value_of_open_source_intelligence_for_irregular_warfare_303364.html
43. Nagl, J. (2002). Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Praeger Publishers.
44. Özdağ, Ü. (2014). İstihbarat teorisi. Kripto Yayınları.
45. Pantucci, R. (2011). A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence Report. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf
46. Pastor-Galindo, J., Nespoli, P., Mármol, F. G. ve Pérez, G. M. (2020). The Not Yet Exploited Goldmine of OSINT: Opportunities, Open Challenges and Future Trends. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 8(January 2020): 10282-10304. DOI:10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2965257
47. Polo, S. M. (2020). The quality of terrorist violence: Explaining the logic of terrorist target choice. Journal of Peace Research, 57(2): 235–250. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319829799
48. Poznansky, M. (2020). Revisiting Plausible Deniability. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1(23): 511- 533.
49. Rudgers, D. F. (2000). The Origins of Covert Action. Journal of Contemporary History, 35(2): 249–262. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200940003500206
50. Russell, R. (2007). Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right. Cambridge University Press.
51. Salehyan, I. (2009). Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Cornell University Press.
52. Scheideman, J. (2011). The Role of Intelligence in Fighting Insurgencies. American Political Science Association. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1915746
53. Schmid, A. (2004). Terrorism - The Definitional Problem. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36(2): 375-419. https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1400&context=jil
54. Sims, J. (2009). A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics. Treverton, G. F. ve Agrell, W. (Ed.). National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects içinde. (ss. 58-92). Cambridge University Press.
55. Smith, G. L. (2019). Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations. International Organization, 73(3): 685- 707.
56. Teamey, K. ve Sweet, J. (2006). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. Military Review, 86(5): 24-29. TEM Daire Başkanlığı, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, İçişleri Bakanlığı. (2022). DEAŞ Terör Örgütü. Terörle Mücadele Akademisi Yayınları.
57. Thompson, Sir R. (1966). Defeating Communist insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. Praeger Publishers.
58. Trinquier, R. (2008). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Praeger Security International.
59. Tınas, M. ve Tuncal, D. (2020). Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Güvenlikte İstihbarat: Değişen Tanımlar, İşleyişler, Kurumlar ve Roller. Çıtak, E. ve Kiraz, S. (Ed.). Uluslararası Güvenlik: Gelenekselden Güncele Bir Gündem Analizi içinde. (ss. 463- 500). Orion Kitabevi.
60. Waldron, J. ve Meisels, T. (2020). Debating targeted killing: counter-terrorism or extrajudicial execution?. Oxford University Press.
61. Walsh, J. I. (2018). The rise of targeted killing. Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(1-2): 143-159. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1393035
62. Warner, M. (2014). The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History. Georgetown University Press.
63. Wheaton, K. J. ve Beerbower, M. T. (2006). Towards a New Definition of Intelligence. Stanford Law & Policy Review, 17(317): 319-330.
64. Yakın, A. (1969). İstihbarat, Casusluk ve Casuslukla Mücadele. Dışişleri Akademisi Yayınları.
65. Zeytoonian, D. (2006). Intelligence Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis. Military Review, 86(5): 30-37.