HUKUK VE EKONOMİ DİSİPLİNLERİ İLİŞKİSİNDE GÜVENİLİR TAAHHÜDÜN ÖNEMİ

Yıl 2022, , 71 - 88, 31.07.2022

Yıldırım Beyazıt Çiçen

https://doi.org/10.53881/hiad.1090679

Öz

Bu çalışmada öncelikle hukuk ve ekonomi disiplinleri ilişkisinden bahsedilmektedir. İki disiplinin birlikte geliştirdiği, kurumsal politikaların nasıl oluştuğu ve politika oluşturma süreci devam eden alt başlıktır. Burada kurumsal yapıda kamu politikasını oluşturan erklerin arasındaki işleyiş anlatılmaktadır. Ardından güvenilir taahhüt kavramı açıklanmaktadır. Devletin yatırımcıya vereceği taahhüdün güvenilir olması için alternatif 4 farklı rejimden bahsedilmektedir. Bunlar bağımsız düzenleyici kurumlar, sözleşme hukukunun kullanılması, düzenleyici süreç, hukuki denetim ve uluslararası tahkim şeklindedir. Sonuç bölümünde güvenilir taahhüdün iktisadi büyüme açısından neden önemli olduğu tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Hukuk ve Ekonomi, Politika Oluşturma Süreci, Güvenilir Taahhüt, İktisadi Büyüme

THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

Öz

This study focuses first and foremost on the relationship between law and economics disciplines. Described in the following sub-title are the institutional policies developed by the two disciplines and the resulting policy making process. A discussion of the interaction between the powers that make up public policy in the institutional structure is presented here. Following this, credible commitment is explained. Four alternative regimes are described to ensure that the commitment of the state to the investor is credible. These are independent regulatory authorities, use of contract law, regulatory process, legal supervision and international arbitration. The final section explains why credible commitment is important for economic growth.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Law and Economics, Policy Making Process, Credible Commitment, Economic Growth

Kaynakça

• Acemoğlu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 113(5), 949-995.
• Acemoğlu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2019). The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. London: Penguin Books.
• Akın, G. G., Aysan, A. F., & Yildiran, L. (2008). Transformation of the Turkish financial sector in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. MPRA Working Papers, No. 17803.
• Auriol, E., & Gary-Bobo, R. J. (2007). On robust constitution design. Theory and Decision, 62(3), 241-279.
• Baykal, M. (2008). Hukuk-ekonomi ilişkisi ve ekonomi hukuku üzerine. Ankara Barosu Dergisi, (4), 76-87.
• Büthe, T., & Milner, H. V. (2014). Foreign direct investment and institutional diversity in trade agreements: Credibility, commitment, and economic flows in the developing world, 1971–2007. World Politics, 66(1), 88-122.
• Cooter, Robert, Thomas Ulen. 2016. Law and Economics. 6. bs. Boston: Pearson Education.
• Çiçen (2015). Türkiye’de ekonomik performansın kurumsal temelleri: Yeni kurumsal iktisat perspektifi. Yayınlanmamış doktora tezi, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.
• Çiçen, Y. B. (2020). Yeni kurumsal iktisat perspektifi ve işlem maliyetleri. Kurumsal İktisat, (ed. C.C. Aktan), Sobiad, 178-215.
• Çetin, T. (2009). Küreselleşme ve özelleştirme ilişkisine eleştirel bir bakış: Hukuk ve iktisat yaklaşımı. Finans ve Ekonomik Yorumlar Dergisi, 46(533), 67-82.
• Demirbag, M., Tatoglu, E., & Glaister, K. W. (2010). Institutional and transaction cost determinants of Turkish MNEs' location choice. International Marketing Review, 27(3), 272-294.
• Dobler, C. (2011). The Impact of Formal and Informal Institutions on Economic Growth: A Case Study on the MENA Region. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishing.
• Epstein, D., & O'halloran, S. (1995). A theory of strategic oversight: Congress, lobbyists, and the bureaucracy. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 11(2) 227-255.
• Estache, A., & Martimort, D. (1999). Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions. World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, No. 2073.
• Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 83-116.
• Irion, K., & Radu, R. (2013). Delegation to independent regulatory authorities in the media sector: A paradigm shift through the lens of regulatory theory. The Independence of the Media and Its Regulatory Agencies. Shedding New Light on Formal and Actual Independence Against the National Context, (eds. W. Schulz, P. Valcke & K. Irion), Bristol UK/Chicago USA: Intellect, 15-54.
• İnsel, A. (2005). İktisat ve hukuk arasındaki karmaşık ilişki. Güncel Hukuk, Aralık, (24), 38-40.
• Hsiung, B. (2006). Economic analysis of law: An inquiry of its underlying logic. Erasmus Law and Economics Review, 2(1), 1-33.
• Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and economic performance: cross‐country tests using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics, 7(3), 207-227.
• Laffont, J. J. (2005). Regulation and Development. 1. bs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Judicial checks and balances. Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 445-470.
• Levy, B., & Spiller, P. T. (1994). The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment: a comparative analysis of telecommunications regulation. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10(2), 201-246.
• Levy, B., & Spiller, P. T. (1996). Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Luo, Y. (2005). Transactional characteristics, institutional environment and joint venture contracts. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(2), 209-230.
• Mackaay, E. (2000). History of law & economics (0200). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 65-117.
• North, D. C. (1993). Institutions and credible commitment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149(1), 11-23.
• North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. The Journal of Economic History, 49(4), 803-832.
• Oğuz, F. (2002). Hukukun ekonomik analizi: Genel bir değerlendirme. Piyasa, 2(1), 3-23.
• Oğuz, F. (2011). Devlet ve Piyasa: Regülasyon Ekonomisine Giriş. Ankara: Seçkin Yayınları.
• Özdemir ve Ketizmen (2014). Türkiye'nin Hukuk Sisteminde Yapısal Dönüşüm. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
• Posner, R. A. (1998). Creating a legal framework for economic development. The World Bank Research Observer, 13(1), 1-11.
• Rodrik, D. (2000). Institutions for high-quality growth: what they are and how to acquire them. Studies in Comparative International Development, 35(3), 3-31.
• Spiller, P. (1995). Regulatory commitment and utilities’ privatization: Implications for future comparative research. Modern Political Economy, Old Topics, New Directions (eds. J. Banks and E. Hanushek). New York: Cambridge University Press, 63-79.
• Stern, J. (1997). What makes an independent regulator independent?. Business Strategy Review, 8(2), 67-74.
• Uğur, M. (2010). Institutions and economic performance: A review of the theory and evidence. MPRA Paper, No. 25909.
• Spiller, P T. (1999). Institutions and commitment. Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies: The Transaction Costs Economics Perspective (ed. Glenn R. Carroll, David J.Teece). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 279-310.
• Spiller, P. T., & Tommasi, M. (2003). The institutional foundations of public policy: a transactions approach with application to Argentina. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19(2), 281-306.
• Smyth, R. (1998). New institutional economics in the post‐socialist transformation debate. Journal of Economic Surveys, 12(4), 361-398.
• Thatcher, M. (2002). Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 954-972.
• Thatcher, M. (2005). The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe. Governance, 18(3), 347-373.
• Williamson, O. E. (1990). A comparison of alternative approaches to economic organization. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 146(1), 61-71.
• Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 595-613.
• Wood, B. D., & Bohte, J. (2004). Political transaction costs and the politics of administrative design. The Journal of Politics, 66(1), 176-202.