Political Economy of Natural Disaster Measures

Year 2019, , 75 - 98, 30.07.2019

Tülin Altun

https://doi.org/10.30927/ijpf.585338

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Societies
do not take adequate action to prevent/mitigation and transfer of risk against
natural disaster hazards. The public sector needs to intervene in market
failures arising from problems such as imperfect/asymmetric information,
myopia, collective inertia. Thus, the fiscal burden of natural disasters on
public finance can be reduced and social welfare can be increased by the more
efficient allocation of social resources. However, the public sector also fails
in this regard. There are political motivations that prevent effective natural
disaster risk management. Politicians pay more attention to policies that will
provide them electoral support in the short term due to the problem of time
inconsistency in public finances. For this reason, they do not make enough regulations
and investments for natural disaster measures, if the benefits of the measures
appear in the long term and put a burden on voters in the short term. They
prefer disaster aids due to election supports. The solution to the problems
arising from political motivations depends on the establishment of institutional
mechanisms to increase democratic accountability and raise awareness of the
risks of natural disasters.

Keywords

Natural Disasters Risks, Asymmetric Information, Collective Inertia, Market Failures, Public Failures

Doğal Afet Önlemlerinin Politik Ekonomisi

Abstract

Toplumlar doğal afet
zararlarının önlenmesi/azaltılması, riskin yayılması için yeterince eylemde
bulunmamaktadır. Kamu kesiminin eksik/ asimetrik bilgi, miyopluk, kolektif
eylemsizlik gibi sorunlardan kaynaklanan piyasa başarısızlıklarına müdahale
etmesi gereklidir. Böylelikle doğal afetlerin kamu maliyesine getireceği mali
yük azaltılabileceği gibi, toplumsal kaynakların daha etkin tahsisi sağlanarak
sosyal refah artırılabilir.  Bununla
birlikte kamu kesimi de bu konuda başarısız olmaktadır. Etkin doğal afet
yönetimi yapılmasını engelleyen politik motivasyonlar bulunmaktadır.
Politikacılar kamu maliyesindeki zaman tutarsızlığı probleminden dolayı
kendilerine kısa vadede seçim desteği sağlayacak politikalara daha fazla önem
verirler. Bu nedenle eğer önlemlerin faydası uzun vadede ortaya çıkıyor ve kısa
vadede seçmenlere yük getiriyor ise, doğal afet önlemlerine ilişkin
düzenlemeleri ve yatırımları yeterince yapmazlar. Seçimsel desteklerden dolayı
afet yardımları yapmayı tercih ederler. Politik motivasyonlardan kaynaklanan
sorunların çözümü, demokratik hesap verebilirliği artıracak kurumsal
mekanizmaların oluşturulmasına ve doğal afet riskleri konusundaki
farkındalıkların artmasına bağlıdır. 

Keywords

Doğal afet riskleri, Asimetrik bilgi, Kolektif eylemsizlik, Piyasa Başarısızlıkları, Kamusal başarısızlıklar

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