Transformation of Israeli Security Organizations after the Yom Kippur War

Year 2022, , 201 - 220, 01.05.2022

Semine Seray Güldane , Ahmet Ateş

https://doi.org/10.53451/ijps.1069303

Abstract

Bu makale, Yom Kippur Savaşı sonrasında İsrail güvenlik kurumlarında yaşanan dönüşümü analiz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, yaşanan dönüşümün teorik ve pratik çerçevesinin çizilmesi için ilk olarak askeri değişim ve istihbarat örgütlerinin değişimine dair literatür sistematik olarak incelenmiştir. Gerçekleştirilen araştırma sonucunda, Yom Kippur Savaşı’nın İsrail politika yapıcıları ve kamuoyu tarafından bir istihbarat başarısızlığı olarak değerlendirildiği ve yaşanan dönüşümün temel sebebinin sosyal travma ve başarısızlığı giderme motivasyonu olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, literatürdeki yaygın görüşün aksine, İsrail askeri kurumlarında yaşanan dönüşümün hem yukarıdan aşağı hem de aşağıdan yukarı olmak üzere karma bir biçimde gerçekleştiği sonucuna varılmıştır. İstihbarat başarısızlığından doğan söz konusu değişimin, sadece savaşın gerçekleştiği tarihler arasında değil öncesi, savaş süreci ve savaş sonrası askeri, siyasi ve stratejik konjunktür göz önüne alındığında farklı dönüşüm faktörlerini kapsayan, hibrit bir şekilde gerçekleştiği değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak, İsrail istihbarat örgütlerinde yaşanan dönüşümün ise 1974 yılında kurulan Agranat Komisyonu’nun önerileri doğrultusunda bireysel ve yapısal olarak iki aşamalı olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Keywords

İstihbarat, İsrail, Yom-Kippur Savaşı, MOSSAD, AMAN

Transformation of Israeli Security Organizations after the Yom Kippur War

Abstract

This article analyzes the transformation of Israeli security organizations after the Yom Kippur War. In this context, the literature on military change and the change of intelligence organizations was systematically examined in order to draw the theoretical and practical framework of the transformation. As a result of the research, we argue that the Yom Kippur War was considered as an intelligence failure by Israeli policy makers and the public, and the main reason for the transformation was the motivation to eliminate social trauma and failure. In addition, contrary to the common view in the literature, the transformation in Israeli military institutions took place in a hybrid manner, both top-down and bottom-up. We also conclude that, given the military, political and strategic conjuncture not only during the war, but also before and after the war, the change in question arising from the failure of the intelligence was two-way, encompassing various transformation factors. Finally, it was found that the transformation in Israeli intelligence organizations has two stages, individually and structurally, in line with the recommendations of the Agranat Commission, which was established in 1974.

Keywords

Intelligence, Israel, the Yom-Kippur War, MOSSAD, AMAN

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