Learning by Sanctioning and Learning by Retaliation: Explaining The Evolution of the European Union’s Sanctions Regime Against Russia (2022–2026)

Abstract

This article examines the twenty-one sanctions packages adopted by the European Union against Russia between February 2022 and July 2026 as a dynamic process of reciprocal learning rather than a sequence of isolated policy decisions. It argues that the EU’s learning by sanctioning and Russia’s learning by retaliation evolved through a mutually reinforcing causal cycle, with each side continuously adapting to the other’s actions. Integrating these two perspectives, the study develops a reciprocal-cycle framework that explains how sanctions and countermeasures co-evolved over time. The findings identify five evolutionary phases—Shock, War Economy, Technology Denial, Anti-Circumvention, and Strategic Attrition—and show that while sanctions failed to alter Russia’s short-term strategic objectives, they gradually weakened its economic, technological, and logistical capacities through cumulative adaptation and capacity erosion.

Keywords

• EU sanctions
• Russia
• learning by sanctioning
• learning by retaliation
• mutual learning cycle

Learning by Sanctioning and Learning by Retaliation: Explaining The Evolution of the European Union’s Sanctions Regime Against Russia (2022–2026)

Abstract

Bu makale, Avrupa Birliği'nin Şubat 2022 ile Temmuz 2026 arasında Rusya'ya karşı kabul ettiği yirmi bir yaptırım paketini, birbirinden bağımsız politika kararlarının bir dizisi olarak değil, karşılıklı öğrenmeye dayalı dinamik bir süreç olarak incelemektedir. Çalışma, Avrupa Birliği'nin yaptırım yoluyla öğrenme ile Rusya'nın misilleme yoluyla öğrenme süreçlerinin, tarafların birbirlerinin hamlelerine sürekli uyum sağladığı karşılıklı olarak birbirini besleyen nedensel bir döngü içinde geliştiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu iki yaklaşımı bütünleştiren araştırma, yaptırımlar ile karşı önlemlerin zaman içerisinde nasıl birlikte evrildiğini açıklayan karşılıklı öğrenme döngüsü çerçevesini geliştirmektedir. Bulgular, yaptırım sürecinin Şok, Savaş Ekonomisi, Teknolojiyi Engelleme, Yaptırımların Aşılmasını Önleme ve Stratejik Yıpratma olmak üzere beş evrimsel aşamadan geçtiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Ayrıca yaptırımların Rusya'nın kısa vadeli stratejik hedeflerini değiştirmekte başarılı olamadığı, ancak kümülatif uyum süreçleri ve kapasite aşınması yoluyla ülkenin ekonomik, teknolojik ve lojistik kapasitesini zaman içinde önemli ölçüde zayıflattığı sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır.

Keywords

• Avrupa Birliği yaptırımları
• Rusya
• yaptırım yoluyla öğrenme
• misilleme yoluyla öğrenme
• karşılıklı öğrenme döngüsü.

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