Güven, Bürokrasi ve Refah Devleti

Year 2017, Volume: 7 Issue: 1, 89 - 115, 30.07.2017

Nurullah Gür

Abstract

Bu makale, sosyal güvenin devletin kurumsal yapısı üzerine etkisini analiz etmektedir. Sosyal güven, bir insanın kişisel olarak tanımadığı insanlara karşı duyduğu güven duygusu olarak tanımlanabilir. Güven, işlem maliyetlerini azaltarak ve bedavacılık sorununu iyileştirerek devletin kurumsal yapısını birçok açıdan etkileyebilmektedir. Bu makale, devletin kurumsal yapısı ile ilgili üç farklı alan üzerine durmaktadır: aşırı bürokrasi, yolsuzluk ve refah devleti. Güvenin yüksek olduğu bir toplumda vatandaşlar gereksiz bürokratik prosedürlere ve yolsuzluklara daha az maruz kalırlar, vergilerini gönül rahatlığıyla öderler ve yüksek vergi gelirleri sayesinde kalkınma dostu kamu harcamalarından daha fazla faydalanırlar. Bu makale, yüksek güvenin devletin kurumsal yapısını toplumun bütününe fayda sağlayacak şekilde çalışır hale getirdiğini göstermektedir.

Keywords

Güven, Aşırı bürokrasi, Düzenleme, Yolsuzluk, Refah devleti

Trust, Bureaucracy, and the Welfare State

Abstract

This paper analyses the effect of social trust on the institutional structure of the state. Social trust can be defined as the level of trust that a given person has toward people whom he or she does not know personally. Trust can affect many aspects of the state’s institutional structure by reducing transaction costs and ameliorating the free-rider problem. This article focuses on three dimensions related to the state’s institutional structure: red tape, corruption, and the welfare state. In a society with a high level of trust, individuals are less subject to unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, pay their taxes with peace of mind, and, thanks to high tax revenues, benefit more from the development-friendly public expenditures. This article indicates that a high level of trust makes the state’s institutional structure function in a way that benefits society as a whole.

Keywords

Trust, Red tape, Corruption, Welfare state, Regulation

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