Uluslararası ve Bölgesel Yolsuzlukla Mücadele Rejimlerinde Yaptırım ve Sosyal Baskı: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz

Year 2020, Volume: 19 Issue: 1, 61 - 77, 27.01.2020

Digdem Soyaltin

https://doi.org/10.21547/jss.524613

Abstract

Uluslararası yaptırımlar, devletlerin üyesi oldukları
kurumların prensiplerini ihlal eden politikalarına karşı kullanılan önemlerdir.
Ekonomik, cezai ve hukuki yaptırımların ihlalci ülkelerde sınırlı etkiye sahip
olması bir alternatif yöntem olarak kınama, ikna ve özellikle akran
değerlendirmesine dayalı sosyal baskıyı öne çıkarmaktadır. Sosyal baskı,
devletlerin üyesi oldukları kurumların değerlendirme takımları tarafından
ortaya konan politika önerilerini dikkate almalarını, statü ve prestij
kazanma arzusu veya statü kaybının yol açacağı dışlanma, aşağılanma gibi sosyal
cezalardan kaçınma gibi motivasyonlarla reform yapmalarını teşvik
edebilir.
Uluslararası ve bölgesel örgütlerin üye ülkeleri için geliştirdikleri izleme
yöntemleri ve değerlendirme takımlarının kurumsal yapısı sosyal baskının
kapasitesini değiştiren özellikler taşıyabilir. İzleme ve akran değerlendirmesi
tutarlı, şeffaf ve tarafsız şekilde uygulanır ve karşılıklı fikir alışverişine
dayanırsa hedef hükümet tarafından daha meşru olarak algılanır ve sosyal
anlamda oluşturacağı baskı da artar

Çalışma
kapsamında Birleşmiş Milletler (küresel), OECD (alt-bölgesel), Avrupa Konseyi
(bölgesel) ve Avrupa Birliği (bölgesel) gibi yolsuzlukla mücadelede öne çıkan
rejimlerin kurumsal özellikleri incelenmiş ve sosyal baskı oluşturmak için
belirtilen koşulları (karşılıklılık,
tarafsızlık, tutarlılık, şeffaflık) ne ölçüde karşıladıkları analiz
edilmiştir.Bu dört örgüt yolsuzlukla mücadele sözleşmelerinde yer alan
ilkelerin üye ülkelerde ne ölçüde uygulanıp uygulanmadığını akran
değerlendirmeleri ile izler ve detaylı öneriler ve eleştiriler sunarak ülkeleri
baskı altına almayı hedeflerler. Fakat bu çalışma kapsamında yapılan karşılaştırmalı
analiz, BM, OECD, Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Birliği’nin yolsuzlukla mücadele
rejimlerinin yol açtığı sosyal baskının varyasyonlar gösterdiğini ortaya
koymuş, örgütlerin izleme ekiplerinin yapısı ve akran değerlendirme
yöntemlerindeki farklıklara odaklanmıştır.

Keywords

Yaptırım, yolsuzluk, sosyal baskı, izleme, Avrupa Birliği

Sanctions and Social Pressure in International and Regional Anti-Corruption Regimes: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Sanctions are measures that
are used by international or regional organizations against the countries
breaching membership principles. As the economic, material or legal sanctions
have limited impact to redress breaches of
membership principles, social sanctions based on shaming, persuasion and peer
pressure have gained more relevance. The recommendations which are put forward by
the evaluation teams of the international or regional organizations might push
countries into reforms once they are exposed to
the social pressure of peers and the public and aim to gain or maximize
status, prestige or to avoid a loss of status. The institutional structure of
monitoring mechanisms and evaluation teams of the international or regional
organizations might have properties that lead to variation in the social
pressure. Once the monitoring and peer reviews are applied
in a transparent, consistent impartial way and based on reciprocal interactions
with the target government, the legitimacy of international demands and
criticism increases and thereby the social pressure becomes more effective.

In
this research, the institutional properties of 
four well-known anti-corruption regimes, namely the United Nations
(global), OECD (sub-regional), Council of Europe (regional) and European Union
(regional), are examined to understand to what extent they meet conditions
(reciprocity, impartiality, consistency, transparency) for effective social
pressure. The comparative analysis conducted in this paper indicates that the
social pressure that emanate from the anti-corruption regimes of United
Nations, OECD, Council of Europe and European Union vary as the institutional
structure of their evaluation teams and methods of their peer reviews have
different properties.

Keywords

Sanction, corruption, social pressure, monitoring, European Union

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