The Position of The History of Science Between the Disciplines of History-Sociology and Philosophy

Year 2024, , 324 - 341, 20.03.2024

Serpil Timur

https://doi.org/10.20981/kaygi.1380515

Abstract

The publication of Thomas Kuhn’s work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, influenced the disciplines of history, philosophy and sociology and followed the results of this work in different directions. The most crucial point for philosophers in Kuhn’s work was the issue of “relativity”, which emerged with the claim that paradigms were “incommensurable”. Philosophers’ preoccupation with the ideas of relativity truth and rationality had been shaped the interperation of Kuhn in philosophical circles. Historians, on the other hand, were dominantly interested in historical causality, especially the “internal” and “external” causes of scientific change. The different reactions of the two groups can be understood in terms of their different disciplinary interests, but they also shared a common intellectual context in the contemporary debates about the politics of scientific knowledge. Kuhn’s work in question came out in a Cold War environment where the concept of the social dimension of science was highly politicized. In the early twentieth century, Hegelian and Marxist narratives of human progress were associated with broad political movements. The resulting ideological tensions soon began to be reflected in the way philosophers of history and science were examined. This common context shaped the readings of Kuhn by both philosophers and historians; However, both of the disciplines had different perspectives. Sociologists, though, made the idea of “relativity”, which rejected by philosophers, the cornerstone of their own sociologies of scientific knowledge. In the same period, both the political conditions of the period and the different perception of Thomas Kuhn among the disciplines of history, sociology and philosophy led the history of science to re-question and defend its own position and methodology.

Keywords

History of Science, Philosophy of Science, Thomas Kuhn, History and Sociology.

Bilim Tarihinin Tarih-Sosyoloji ve Felsefe Disiplinleri Arasındaki Konumu

Abstract

Thomas Kuhn’un Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı adlı eserinin yayınlanmasıyla birlikte tarih, felsefe ve sosyoloji disiplinleri bu eserden etkilenmiş ve bu eserin sonuçlarını değişik yönlerde takip etmişlerdi. Kuhn’un eserinde felsefeciler için en can alıcı nokta, paradigmaların “kıyaslanamaz” olduğu iddiasıyla ortaya çıkan “görelilik” meselesiydi. Felsefecilerin görelilik ve buna bağlı olarak hakikat ve rasyonellik gibi konularla meşgul olmaları, Kuhn’un felsefî çevrelerdeki yorumunu da belirlemiş oldu. Diğer taraftan tarihçiler daha çok tarihsel nedensellik, özellikle de bilimsel değişimin “içsel” ve “dışsal” nedenleriyle ilgileniyorlardı. İki grubun farklı tepkileri, farklı disiplinlere ait ilgi alanları açısından anlaşılabilir, fakat bu iki grup aynı zamanda bilimsel bilgi politikalarına ilişkin o dönemdeki tartışmalarda ortak bir entelektüel bağlamı paylaşıyorlardı. Kuhn’un söz konusu eseri, bilimin toplumsal boyutu kavramının oldukça siyasallaştığı bir Soğuk Savaş ortamında ortaya çıkmıştı. Yirminci yüzyılın başlarında, Hegelci ve Marksist insani ilerleme anlatıları geniş siyasi hareketlerle ilişkilendirilmişti. Ortaya çıkan ideolojik gerilimler çok geçmeden tarih ve bilim felsefecilerinin incelenme biçimine de yansımaya başlamıştı. İşte bu ortak bağlam hem filozofların hem de tarihçilerin Kuhn okumalarını şekillendirmişti; ancak bu okumalar birbirinden farklı şekilde anlaşılmıştı. Sosyologlar ise felsefecilerin reddettiği “görelilik” düşüncesini, kendi bilimsel bilgi sosyolojilerinin mihenk taşı yapmışlardı. Aynı süreçte hem dönemin siyasi koşulları hem de Thomas Kuhn’un tarih, sosyoloji ve felsefe disiplinleri arasındaki farklı algılanışı bilim tarihinin kendi konumu ve metodolojisini yeniden sorgulamaya ve savunmaya yönlendirmişti.

Keywords

Bilim Tarihi, Bilim Felsefesi, Thomas Kuhn, Tarih ve Sosyoloji

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