Abstract
Bilinçli özneler olarak bizler davranışlarımızı kontrol edebildiğimize inanırız. Fakat epifenomenalizme göre istek, inanç, korku vb. gibi zihinsel durumlar davranışlarımıza bir etkide bulunmaz. Davranışlarımızın nedeni beyinde gerçekleşen nöral süreçlerdir ve zihinsel durumlar fiziksel durumların gölgeleri gibidir. Zihin felsefecileri, ahlaki ve epistemik olarak sorumluluk sahibi failler olduğumuz inancını korumak adına genellikle zihnin nedensel olarak etkili olduğu fikrini yani zihinsel nedenselliği kabul etmeye eğilimlidir ve bu sebeple de zihinsel nedenselliği destekleyen argümanlara başvururlar. Bu agümanlar sağduyu argümanı, ahlaki sorumluluk argümanı ve epistemik argümandır. Bunların içinde epifenomenalizme karşı literatürde en sık kullanılan argüman ahlaki sorumluluk argümanıdır. Bu makalede amacım epistemik argümanın epifenomealizmin iç tutarsızlığını, diğer argümanlara kıyasla, daha açık bir şekilde ortaya çıkardığını göstermektir. Şöyle ki çıkarımsal bilgi epifenomenalistlerin kendi görüşlerini desteklemek için başvurdukları bir bilgi türüdür. Epistemik argümana göre, çıkarımsal bilgi için zihinsel nedensellik gereklidir. Zihinsel nedenselliği reddederek epifenomenalizmi kabul ettiğimizde, çıkarımsal bilgiden bahsedemeyiz ve epifenomenalizmin doğruluğuna inanmak için hiçbir gerekçemiz kalmaz. Sonuç olarak, çıkarımsal bilgi olmadan epifenomenalistler ‘zihnin nedensel olarak etkisiz olduğu’ inancının doğruluğunu bilememek gibi bir pozisyonda kalma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıyadır.
References
- Blackmore, S. (2019). Bilinç: Çok Kısa Bir Başlangıç. (çev. Oğuz Akçelik). İstanbul: İKÜ Yayınevi.
- Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Abstract
As conscious agents, we believe that we can control our behavior. But according to the epiphenomenalism, our mental states such as desires, beliefs, fears, etc. have no causal effect on our behavior. Our behavior is caused by neural processes in the brain, and mental states are like shadows of physical states. Philosophers of mind generally tend to accept mental causation, the idea that the mind is causally effective, in order to save the belief that we are morally and epistemically responsible agents. For this reason they appeal to arguments in support of mental causation. These arguments are the common sense argument, the moral responsibility argument and the epistemic argument. Among these, the most frequently used argument against epiphenomenalism is the moral responsibility argument. My aim in this paper is to show that the epistemic argument more clearly reveals the internal inconsestency of epiphenomealism than any other argument. That is to say, inferential knowledge is a type of knowledge that epiphenomenalists use to support their views. According to the epistemic argument, mental causation is necessary to save inferential knowledge. When we accept epiphenomenalism, we cannot speak of inferential knowledge and have no reason to believe in the truth of epiphenomenalism. Consequently, without inferential knowledge, epiphenomenalists are in danger of being in the position of not knowing the truth of the belief that 'the mind is causally inert'.
Keywords
Epiphenomenalism Mental Causation Exclusion Argument Inferential Knowledge. Epistemic Luck.
References
- Blackmore, S. (2019). Bilinç: Çok Kısa Bir Başlangıç. (çev. Oğuz Akçelik). İstanbul: İKÜ Yayınevi.
- Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, Reasons and Causes, Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1963): 685–700.
- Fodor, J. (1989). Making Mind Matter More, Philosophical Topics, 17(1): 59–79.
- Heil, J. (2020). Zihin Felsefesi: Çağdaş Bir Giriş, (çev.S. Akbıyık ve M. Bilgili). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- Hodges, M., & Lachs, J. (1979). Meaning and the impotence hypothesis. Review of Metaphysics, 32: 515-529.
- Horgan, T. (1987). Supervenient Qualia, Philosophical Review, 96: 491–520.
- Huxley, T. (1898). Methods and results: Collected Essays, Volume I. London: Macmilthen.
- Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136.
- James, W. (1891). The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1, Chapter 5. The automaton theory. H. Holt, New York.
- Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
- Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
- Kozuch, B. (2020). Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism. The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. (ed. Uriah Kriegel). https://philarchive.org/archive/KOZCAM
- McLaughlin, B. P. (1989). Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol.3, ss.109–135.
- Moore, D. (2014), The Epistemic Argument for Mental Causation, The Philosophical Forum, 45(2): 149–168.
- Moore, D., (2012). On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection, The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4: 627–641.
- Pricthard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, H. (1967). The Nature of Mental States, Art, Mindand Religion. (ed.) W.H. Capitan ve D.D. Meril). Pittsburgh University Press, ss. 223-231.
- Revonsuo, A. (2016). Bilinç: Öznelliğin Bilimi, (çev. Nermin Tenekeci). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- Russo, A. (2017). The Supervenience Argument against Non-Reductive Physicalism, Just The Arguments 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, (ed.). Michae Bruce, Steven Barbone, Blackwell Publication, ss. 314-317.
- Robb, D. and John H., (2019). Mental Causation, T he S tanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed. Edward N. Zalta), URL = <https://plato.stan- ford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/mental-causation/>.
- Robinson, W. (2023). Epiphenomenalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed. Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/epiphenomenalism/>.
- Rostek, J. (2023). “Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument”, Acta Analytica, ss.1-19. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-023-00565-0
- Searle, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind, (Nineth Printing-2002). MIT Press.
- Searle, J. (2002). Consciousness and Language, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univesity Press.
- Searle, J. (2021). Zihin: Kısa Bir Giriş, (çev. Deniz Saraç). İstanbul: Albaraka Yayınları.
- Stern, R. (2020). Transcendental Arguments, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Ed. Edward N. Zalta). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/transcendental-arguments/>.
- Taylor, R., (1963). Metaphysics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Details
| Primary Language | Turkish |
|---|---|
| Subjects | Systematic Philosophy (Other) |
| Journal Section | Research Article |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | March 20, 2024 |
| Submission Date | December 26, 2023 |
| Acceptance Date | February 27, 2024 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2024 |
Cite
e-ISSN: 2645-8950