From The Ontology of Discontinuity Towards An Ethics of Continuum: A Critique of The Nature-Artifice Dualism

Abstract

Abstract: This paper argues that the artificial–natural distinction has historically functioned not only as a descriptive ontological classification, but also as an ethical mechanism that establishes an evaluative order placing the “artificial” in a superior position relative to the “natural.” In Ancient Greek thought, the initial formation of this distinction, namely the physis–techne tension, situates human activity within the continuity of nature; whereas in the modern period, the Cartesian subject–object dualism transforms this tension into a sharp ontology of discontinuity. Nevertheless, in both Ancient Greek philosophy and modern thought, the artificial–natural distinction has continued to operate as the expression of a strong and persistent hierarchical valuation established in favor of the artificial. In order to substantiate this claim, the article employs Nietzsche’s analyses of value creation, the immanent normativity of life, and the relation between force and form, thereby making visible that this distinction functions not only as an ontological classification but also as an ethical orientation. Within this framework, the study neither returns to the hierarchical ontology of continuity in Ancient Greek ethics nor adopts the hierarchical ontology of discontinuity characteristic of modernity. Instead, drawing upon the conceptual resources provided by Nietzsche, it proposes to rethink the distinction between the “artificial” and the “natural” in accordance with a non-hierarchical principle of ethical continuity. Through this alternative mode of ethical reflection, it becomes possible both to reinterpret the historical tensions between continuity and discontinuity and to provide a normative grounding for the problems that emerge at the intersection of contemporary philosophy of technology and contemporary ethics.

Keywords

• Nature,
• culture,
• dualism
• techne
• physis
• technology
• Nietzsche

Süreksizlik Ontolojisinden Süreklilik Etiğine Doğru: Yapay-Doğal Ayrımının Bir Eleştirisi

Abstract

Öz: Bu makale, yapay–doğal ayrımının tarihsel süreçte yalnızca ontolojik düzeyde betimleyici bir sınıflandırma olarak işlemediğini; aynı zamanda etik bir işlev üstlenerek “yapay” olanı “doğal” olana kıyasla üstün bir konuma yerleştiren bir değerleme düzeni oluşturduğunu savunmaktadır. Antik Yunan düşüncesinde bu ayrımın ilk biçimlenişi olan physis–techne gerilimi, insan etkinliğini doğanın sürekliliği içinde konumlandırırken; modern dönemde Kartezyen özne–nesne düalizmi bu gerilimi keskin bir süreksizlik ontolojisine dönüştürür. Bununla birlikte, hem Antik Yunan felsefesinde hem de modern düşüncede yapay–doğal ayrımı, yapay olanın lehine kurulan güçlü ve istikrarlı bir hiyerarşik değerlemenin ifadesi olmayı sürdürmüştür. Makale bu savı temellendirmek üzere, Nietzsche’nin değer yaratımı, yaşamın içkin normativitesi ve güç–form ilişkisine dair analizlerini kullanmakta ve böylece söz konusu ayrımın yalnızca ontolojik bir tasnif değil, aynı zamanda etik bir yönelim ağı olarak işlediğini görünür kılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, ne Antik Yunan etiğinin hiyerarşik süreklilik ontolojisine geri dönmekte ne de modernitenin hiyerarşik süreksizlik ontolojisini benimsemektedir. Bunun yerine, Nietzsche’nin sağladığı kavramsal imkânlardan hareketle “yapay” ile “doğal” arasındaki ayrımı hiyerarşik olmayan bir etik süreklilik ilkesi doğrultusunda yeniden düşünmeyi önermektedir. Bu alternatif etik düşünme tarzı ile hem tarihsel süreklilik/süreksizlik gerilimlerini yeniden yorumlama hem de çağdaş teknoloji felsefesi ile çağdaş etiğin kesişim alanında ortaya çıkan sorunlara normatif bir temel sunma imkânı ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Keywords

• Doğa,
• Kültür,
• techne
• physis
• düalizm
• teknoloji
• Nietzsche

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