Korsgaard on Self-Constitution
Abstract
Christine Korsgaard claims that Kantian moral law means the law of self-constitution and that unless we fully understand what self-constitution means in Kant, we cannot comprehend Kantian morality. Korsgaard’s idea of self-constitution is based on the idea that the unity of an action and the unity of an agent are not detachable. In this paper, I will examine Korsgaard’s Kantian notion of the self, and, correspondingly, her idea of a good action. However, in doing so, I will claim that her account of the self begins from an assumption, that is the mind is transparent, in other words, we are completely aware of our desires, motives and inclinations.
Keywords
References
- ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson. London: Penguin, 2004.
- KARLSSON, Mikael. ‘Reason, Passion and the Influencing Motives of the Will’, in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise, Blackwell, 2005.
- KORSGAARD, Christine M. ‘Personal Identity and the Unity of the Agency’: A Kantian Response to Parfit, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No: 2, 1989, pp. 101-132.
- KORSGAARD, Christine M. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- KORSGAARD, Christine M., The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- MCDONALD, Fritz J. ‘Chris M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 13, 2010, pp. 235-236.
- NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1966.
Details
Primary Language
Turkish
Subjects
-
Journal Section
Research Article
Authors
Zeynep Talay Turner
This is me
KOÇ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
Türkiye
Publication Date
April 30, 2017
Submission Date
April 23, 2017
Acceptance Date
February 28, 2017
Published in Issue
Year 2017 Number: 28