Christine Korsgaard claims that Kantian moral law means the law of self-constitution and that unless we fully understand what self-constitution means in Kant, we cannot comprehend Kantian morality. Korsgaard’s idea of self-constitution is based on the idea that the unity of an action and the unity of an agent are not detachable. In this paper, I will examine Korsgaard’s Kantian notion of the self, and, correspondingly, her idea of a good action. However, in doing so, I will claim that her account of the self begins from an assumption, that is the mind is transparent, in other words, we are completely aware of our desires, motives and inclinations.
Bölüm | Araştırma Makalesi |
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Yazarlar | |
Yayımlanma Tarihi | 30 Nisan 2017 |
Gönderilme Tarihi | 23 Nisan 2017 |
Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2017 |
e-ISSN: 2645-8950