Analitik Felsefe Neden Natüralizme Karşıdır?

Year 2021, , 289 - 305, 15.03.2021

Serdal Tümkaya

https://doi.org/10.20981/kaygi.893011

Abstract

Analitik felsefe (AF) kendisini Kıta felsefesi olarak adlandırılan rakibinden bir dizi çok önemli özelliğiyle ayırt etmiştir. Bunlardan bir tanesi kendisinin bilim ile olan ilişkisidir. AF geleneği son 120 yılda çokça genişleyip değiştiği için ortada bilime karşı sabit bir tutumun olması zaten beklenmese de yakından bir bakış aslında AF’nin bilim ile felsefe arasına katı sınırlar çekme çabasının onun doğum lekesi olduğunu gösterecektir. AF bir asırdan uzun tarihi boyunca neredeyse her zaman bu özelliğini korumuştur. Bu nedenle, AF esasen felsefi natüralizmin tezi olan bilim ve felsefe sürekliliği fikrinin tam karşısında yer almaktadır.

Keywords

Analitik Felsefe, Natüralizm, Sezgiler, Metafelsefe, Bilimselcilik, Süreklilik Tezi

Why is Analytic Philosophy against Naturalism?

Abstract

Analytic philosophy (AP) has proudly distinguished itself from its prominent opponent in that it is a much more science-friendly philosophy. Undoubtedly, analytic tradition has become much more widened and enriched from its inception. With nearly 100–120 years of history, this tradition has borne immense variety. Thus it is not expected that its relation to science is fixed and specific. However, a much closer look would reveal that AP bears its almost universal claim to the distinction between philosophy and science as its birthmark. This tradition has successfully preserved this feature no matter what. For these reasons, AP is categorically against naturalist philosophy, whose distinguishing mark is the continuity thesis, the thesis that philosophy and sciences are continuous.

Keywords

Analytic Philosophy, Naturalism, Intuitions, Metaphilosophy, Scientism, The Continuity Thesis

References

• BOURGET, David and David CHALMERS (2014). “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical Studies, 170 (3): 465–500. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7.
• CARNAP, Rudolf (1955). “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages.” Philosophical Studies 6 (3): 33–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02330951.
• CARNAP, Rudolf (1959). “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language.” Logical Positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer, translated by Arthur Pap, pp. 60–81. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
• CARNAP, Rudolf; NEURATH, Otto & Hans HAHN (1929). “The Scientific World Conception: The Vienna Circle,” Vienna: Artur Wolf. 1929, http://evidencebasedcryonics.org/pdfs/viennacircle.pdf.
• CHURCHLAND, Patricia Smith (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• CHURCHLAND, Patricia Smith and Terrence J. SEJNOWSKI (1992). The Computational Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• FEYERABEND, Paul (1963). “Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,” The Review of Metaphysics, 17 (1): 49–66. https://doi.org/10.2307/20123984.
• FREGE, Gottlob (1956). “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” Mind, 65 (259): 289–311.
• GLOCK, Hans-Johann (2008). What Is Analytic Philosophy?, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
• IRZIK, Gürol (2010). “20. Yüzyıl Bilim Felsefesi Tarihini Yeniden Yazmak.” In Anlam Kavramı Üzerine Yeni Denemeler, ed. S. Kibar, S. Bayram, ve A. Sol, 33–46. Legal Yayınları.
• JACKSON, Frank (1982). “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–36. https://doi.org/10.2307/2960077.
• KITCHER, Philip (1992). “The Naturalists Return,” Philosophical Review, 101 (1): 53–114. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185044.
• KUŞÇU, Egemen Seyfettin (2017). “Güncel Analitik Felsefenin Ontolojisinde Yeni-Aristotelesçilik: Gerçekten Yeni Mi?”, Kutadgubilig, 34: 631–57.
• MAYR, Ernst (1982). The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
• MCGINN, Colin (1989). “Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?” Mind, 98 (391): 349–66. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.349.
• MOORE, George Edward (1959). “A Defense of Commonsense.” Philosophical Papers, pp. 32–45, London: George Allen & Unwin.
• NOLAN, Daniel (2014) “The A Posteriori Armchair,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93 (2): 211–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.961165.
• ÖZER, Özge, and Ayhan SOL (2019). “From Moral Intuitions to Free Will Intuitions: A Dual Interacting-Process Model,” Beytulhikme, 9 (4): 881–97.
• PRESTON, Aaron (2010). Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, London and New York: Continuum.
• QUARTZ, Steven R. and Terrence J. SEJNOWSKI (2003). Liars, Lovers, and Heroes : What the New Brain Science Reveals about How We Become Who We Are, New York: Quill.
• QUINE, Willard Van Orman (1951). “Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review, 60 (1): 20–43.
• QUINE, Willard Van Orman (1969). “Epistemology Naturalized.” Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp. 69–90, New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press.
• REICHENBACH, Hans (2013a). Bilime Yeni Pozitivist Bakış. İstanbul Konferansları, ed. Remzi Demir ve İnan Kalaycıoğulları, çev. Nusret Hızır ve Halil Vehbi Eralp, Ankara: Epos Yayınları.
• REICHENBACH, Hans (2013b). “Descartes ve Rasyonalizm,” Bilime Yeni Pozitivist Bakış. İstanbul Konferansları, ed. Remzi Demir ve İnan Kalaycıoğulları, çev. Nusret Hızır ve Halil Vehbi Eralp, ss. 39–49, Ankara: Epos Yayınları.
• REICHENBACH, Hans (2013c). “Felsefe ve Tabiat Bilimleri,” Bilime Yeni Pozitivist Bakış. İstanbul Konferansları, ed. Remzi Demir ve İnan Kalaycıoğulları, çev. Nusret Hızır ve İnan Kalaycıoğulları, ss. 13–21, Ankara: Epos Yayınları.
• RORTY, Richard (1970). “In Defense of Eliminative Materialism,” The Review of Metaphysics, 24: 112–21.
• ROSS, Don; James LADYMAN & David SPURRETT (2007). “In Defense of Scientism.” Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, pp. 1–65, New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
• RUSSELL, Bertrand (1923). “Vagueness,” Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1 (2): 84–92. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402308540623.
• RUSSELL, Bertrand (2005). “On Denoting,” Mind, 114 (456): 873–87.
• SACHS, Carl B (2018). “‘We Pragmatists Mourn Sellars as a Lost Leader’: Sellars’ Pragmatist Distinction Between Signifying and Picturing,” Sellars and the History of Philosophy, edited by Corti and Nunziante, Routledge.
• SEJNOWSKI, Terrence J. & Steven R. QUARTZ (2002). Liars, Lovers and Heroes: How the New Brain Science Reveals about How We Become Who We Are, New York: HarperCollins.
• SELLARS, Wilfrid (1991). “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” Science, Perception, and Reality, pp. 1–40, London: Ridgeview Pub Co.
• SPURRETT, David (2008). “Why I Am Not an Analytic Philosopher,” South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2): 153–63. https://doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v27i2.31509.
• WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig (2013). Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, çev. Oruç Aruoba, 7. Baskı, İstanbul: Metis.