Fizikselcilik Karşıtı Bilgi Argümanının Bir Savunusu

Abstract

Frank Jackson’ın bilgi argümanı, bilinçli zihin durumlarımızın birinci kişi gözünden elde edilen öznel bilgisinin beyin durumlarının nesnel bilgisine indirgenemeyeceği iddiasından bilinçli zihin durumlarının fiziksel olmadığı sonucuna varır. Günümüz zihin felsefesi literatüründe bu argümana yöneltilen birçok itiraz bulunabilir. Bu çalışmada, bilgi argümanının içerdiği iddia ve varsayımları ortaya koyduktan sonra, argümanın her adımına getirilen başlıca itirazları ayrı ayrı ele alıyor ve bilgi argümanını bu itirazlar karşısında savunuyorum. Buradaki amacım, argümanın sağlamlığını kanıtlamak değil, fakat Jackson’a yöneltilen itirazların sorunlarını ve zayıf yönlerini ortaya koyarak bilgi argümanının sağlamlığına ve dolayısıyla fizikselciliğin yanlış olduğuna inanmanın hala makul bir felsefi pozisyon olduğunu göstermek.

Keywords

• Bilgi Argümanı
• Fizikselcilik
• Görüngüsel Bilgi
• Bilinç

A Defense of the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism

Abstract

According to Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, the fact that the subjective knowledge of conscious mental states cannot be reduced to the objective knowledge of brain states shows us that conscious mental states are not physical states. There are many rejoinders to this argument in contemporary philosophy of mind. In this article, after laying down the claims and assumptions that the knowledge argument rests on, I defend the argument against each major objection in the literature. My aim here is not to prove that the knowledge argument is sound, but to show that none of the objections are strong enough and that it can still be reasonable to believe that the knowledge argument is sound and physicalism is false.

Keywords

• The Knowledge Argument
• Physicalism
• Phenomenal Knowledge
• Consciousness

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