An Examination of David Hume’s Use of “Propositon” and “Deduction” in Hume’s Law: An Objection to the Standart Interpretation of the “Is-Ought” Problem

Year 2015, Issue: 24, 133 - 150, 30.04.2015

Emre Erdenk

https://doi.org/10.20981/kuufefd.31170

Abstract

Contemporary scholars frequently interpreted Hume’s Law as a logical or semantic thesis. Accordingly, no argument can have a conclusion with moral content without having at least one premise containing a moral term. This interpretation depends on the misconception of Hume’s use of the terms “proposition” and “deduction”. I argue that “proposition” and “deduction” in the relevant context should not be interpreted anachronistically. The correct interpretation of these terms would be that; (i) “proposition” has no special (logical) meaning, and (ii) “deduction” means very broadly all types of multi-step inferences. In this case, Hume’s Law offers a wider claim than the logical and semantic thesis suggest. In this paper, I am going to argue for this correct interpretation of Hume’s use of the terms “proposition” and “deduction”. If we appeal to this correct interpretation, we can see that Hume’s thesis has no specifically a logical or semantic point. Hume wants to argue instead that our moral judgments have no underpinning psychological relations of ideas or matters of facts. According to this interpretation, it can be seen that the crucial term of the “is-ought” passage is Hume’s “relations”.

Keywords

Metaethics; Fact-Value Distinction; Morality; Sentimentalism; Emotivism; Moral Judgments; Normativity

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