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A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism

Year 2015, Issue: 2 - 2015, 14 - 40, 30.04.2015

Abstract

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References

  • Berker, Selim. 2011. “Gupta’s gambit”, Philosophical Studies, 152:17-39.
  • Brewer, Bill. 1999. Perception and Reason, Oxford University Press.
  • Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. 2008. “Either/Or”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • Cohen, Stewart. 2002. “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.65, Number 2.
  • Crane, Tim. 2006. “Is There a Perceptual Relation?”, in Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press.
  • Frey, Christopher. 2011. “On the Rational Contribution of Experiential Transparency”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXX II No.3.
  • Gaskin, Richard, 2008, “Review of Empiricism and Experience”, Mind, Vol.117.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford University Press.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2009. “Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to
  • McDowell, Peacocke, and Neta”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXIX No.2.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2011. “Replies to Selim Berker and Karl Schafer”, Philosophical Studies, 152:41-53.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2011. “Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational Role”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXX II No.3.
  • Heck, Richard. 2000. “Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of reasonss””, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No.4.
  • Huemer, Michael. 2006. “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition”, American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol 43, Number 2.
  • Markie, Peter. 2005. “The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification”, Philosophical Studies 126.
  • Martin, M. G. F.. 2006. “On Being Alienated”, in Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 1982. “Criteia, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455-79. Reprinted in Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Harvard University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 1986. “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, in Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds), Subject, Thought, and Context, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Reprinted in Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Harvard University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 1994. Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 2008. “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • McDowell, John, 2008, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, in John McDowell: experience, norm, and nature, Jacob Lindgaard (ed), Blackwell Publishing Company.
  • McDowell, John. 2009. “The Given in Experience: Comment on Gupta”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXIX No.2.
  • Neta, Ram. 2008. “In Defence of Disjunctivism”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • Neta, Ram. 2009. “Empiricism about Experience”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.LXXIX No.2.
  • Prichard, Duncan. 2008. “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • Prichard, Duncan, 2012, Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford University Press.
  • Pryor, Jim. 2000. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, Nous 34:4.
  • Pryor, Jim. 2004. “What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”, Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology.
  • Schafer, Karl. 2011. “The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience”, Philosophical Studies, 152: 1-15.
  • Stroud, Barry. 2009. “Scepticism and the Senses”, European Journal of Philosophy 17:4, pp.559-570.
  • White, Roger. 2006. “Problems for Dogmatism”, Philosophical Studies 131.
  • Wright, Crispin. 2002. “Anti-Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol 65, Number 2.
  • Wright, Crispin. 2008. “Comments on John McDowell’s “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument””, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.

A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism

Year 2015, Issue: 2 - 2015, 14 - 40, 30.04.2015

Abstract

--

References

  • Berker, Selim. 2011. “Gupta’s gambit”, Philosophical Studies, 152:17-39.
  • Brewer, Bill. 1999. Perception and Reason, Oxford University Press.
  • Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. 2008. “Either/Or”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • Cohen, Stewart. 2002. “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.65, Number 2.
  • Crane, Tim. 2006. “Is There a Perceptual Relation?”, in Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press.
  • Frey, Christopher. 2011. “On the Rational Contribution of Experiential Transparency”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXX II No.3.
  • Gaskin, Richard, 2008, “Review of Empiricism and Experience”, Mind, Vol.117.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford University Press.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2009. “Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to
  • McDowell, Peacocke, and Neta”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXIX No.2.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2011. “Replies to Selim Berker and Karl Schafer”, Philosophical Studies, 152:41-53.
  • Gupta, Anil. 2011. “Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational Role”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXX II No.3.
  • Heck, Richard. 2000. “Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of reasonss””, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No.4.
  • Huemer, Michael. 2006. “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition”, American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol 43, Number 2.
  • Markie, Peter. 2005. “The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification”, Philosophical Studies 126.
  • Martin, M. G. F.. 2006. “On Being Alienated”, in Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 1982. “Criteia, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455-79. Reprinted in Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Harvard University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 1986. “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, in Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds), Subject, Thought, and Context, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Reprinted in Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Harvard University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 1994. Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • McDowell, John. 2008. “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • McDowell, John, 2008, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, in John McDowell: experience, norm, and nature, Jacob Lindgaard (ed), Blackwell Publishing Company.
  • McDowell, John. 2009. “The Given in Experience: Comment on Gupta”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXIX No.2.
  • Neta, Ram. 2008. “In Defence of Disjunctivism”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • Neta, Ram. 2009. “Empiricism about Experience”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.LXXIX No.2.
  • Prichard, Duncan. 2008. “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
  • Prichard, Duncan, 2012, Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford University Press.
  • Pryor, Jim. 2000. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, Nous 34:4.
  • Pryor, Jim. 2004. “What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”, Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology.
  • Schafer, Karl. 2011. “The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience”, Philosophical Studies, 152: 1-15.
  • Stroud, Barry. 2009. “Scepticism and the Senses”, European Journal of Philosophy 17:4, pp.559-570.
  • White, Roger. 2006. “Problems for Dogmatism”, Philosophical Studies 131.
  • Wright, Crispin. 2002. “Anti-Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol 65, Number 2.
  • Wright, Crispin. 2008. “Comments on John McDowell’s “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument””, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Mcpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
There are 33 citations in total.

Details

Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Bosuk Yoon This is me

Publication Date April 30, 2015
Published in Issue Year 2015 Issue: 2 - 2015

Cite

APA Yoon, B. (2015). A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi(2), 14-40.
AMA Yoon B. A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism. KFD. April 2015;(2):14-40.
Chicago Yoon, Bosuk. “A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, no. 2 (April 2015): 14-40.
EndNote Yoon B (April 1, 2015) A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 14–40.
IEEE B. Yoon, “A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism”, KFD, no. 2, pp. 14–40, April 2015.
ISNAD Yoon, Bosuk. “A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 (April 2015), 14-40.
JAMA Yoon B. A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism. KFD. 2015;:14–40.
MLA Yoon, Bosuk. “A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, no. 2, 2015, pp. 14-40.
Vancouver Yoon B. A Critique of Epistemological Disjunctivism. KFD. 2015(2):14-40.