Abstract
Bilimin ve bilimsel bilginin doğasını açıklamak için farklı pek çok yaklaşım
geliştirilmiştir. Özellikle ondokuzuncu yüzyıldaki bazı bilimsel kuramların (evrim
kuramı gibi) tercihinde toplumsal etmenlerin rolünün gözlemlenmesi, bilimsel
bilginin toplumbilimsel bir araştırma konusu olduğu kanısını yaygınlaştırmıştır.
Bu süreçte ortaya konan açıklama ve gerekçelendirme modellerinden biri de
“Strong Programme” (Güçlü Program) olarak anılandır. “Strong Programme”ın
temel savı, bilimsel kuramların tercihinde sanıldığı gibi ussal ve evrensel
ölçütlerin değil, toplumsal etmenlerin belirleyici olduğu yönündeydi. Dolayısıyla
bu görüşü savunanlar, bilim ve bilimsel yöntem için ortaya konan tüm ussalcı
çözümlemeleri reddettiler. Bu çalışmada, “Strong Programme”ın ileri sürdüğü
savların haklılığı ve sanıldığı gibi usçu bir yaklaşım olmaksızın bilimin gerçek
doğasını anlamanın olanaklı olup olmadığı soruşturulmaktadır. Bilimin içeriğinin
bütünüyle ve sadece toplumsal etmenlerce belirlenemeyeceği, doğa olaylarının
da kendi başlarına anlamlı olabileceği ileri sürülmektedir.
References
- Bacon, Francis [1620] (1900). Novum Organum, translated by R. Ellis and J. Spedding, London: George Routledge & Sons, Limited.
- Barnes, Barry (1974). Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston.
- Barnes, Barry and David Bloor, 1982: “Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge”, in Rationality and Relativism, eds., by M. Hollis and S. Lukes, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Feyerabend, Paul (1975). Against Method, New Left Bookstore: London.
- Laudan, Larry (1984). “The Pseudo-Science of Science?”, in J. Brown (ed.) Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Lukes, Steven (1995). “Some Problems about Rationality” in Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, ed. by M. Martin and L.C. McIntyre, London: MIT Press.
- McCarthy, Thomas (1988). “Scientific Rationality and The ‘Strong Program’ in the Sociology of Knowledge” in Construction and Constraint, ed. by E. McMullian, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
- Rescher, Nicholas (1977). Dialectics: A Contraversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, SUNY.
- Shapere, Dudley (1982). “The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy”, Philosophy of Science 49: pp.485-525.
- Winch, Peter (1958). The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Winch, Peter (1970). “Understanding a Primitive Society”, in Rationality, ed. by B. R. Wilson, Harper.
Abstract
Various approaches have been made for understanding the nature of
science and scientific knowledge. The social factors that played some role during
the choice of scientific theories (like the theory of evolution) in the nineteenth
century popularised the opinion that the scientific knowledge is the subject of a
sociological research. During the ongoing discussions, one of the explanation or
the justification models that was proposed is known as “the Strong Programme.”
The main claim of “the Strong Programme” is that the social factors have a
determining role for the choice of scientific theories, rather than the rational
and universal criteria one may expect. Hence, those who were behind this view
rejected all of the rational analyses made for the sciences and the scientific
methods. In this paper, we try to investigate the validity of the claims of “the
Strong Programme,” and to clarify whether it is possible to understand the real
nature of science without any rational approach. It is argued that it would be
insufficient to determine the content of the science merely by the social factors, the
natural facts might be meaningful by themselves as well.
Keywords
Strong Programme Scientific Method Sociology of Knowledge Rationality Barry Barnes David Bloor
References
- Bacon, Francis [1620] (1900). Novum Organum, translated by R. Ellis and J. Spedding, London: George Routledge & Sons, Limited.
- Barnes, Barry (1974). Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston.
- Barnes, Barry and David Bloor, 1982: “Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge”, in Rationality and Relativism, eds., by M. Hollis and S. Lukes, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Feyerabend, Paul (1975). Against Method, New Left Bookstore: London.
- Laudan, Larry (1984). “The Pseudo-Science of Science?”, in J. Brown (ed.) Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Lukes, Steven (1995). “Some Problems about Rationality” in Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, ed. by M. Martin and L.C. McIntyre, London: MIT Press.
- McCarthy, Thomas (1988). “Scientific Rationality and The ‘Strong Program’ in the Sociology of Knowledge” in Construction and Constraint, ed. by E. McMullian, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
- Rescher, Nicholas (1977). Dialectics: A Contraversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, SUNY.
- Shapere, Dudley (1982). “The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy”, Philosophy of Science 49: pp.485-525.
- Winch, Peter (1958). The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Winch, Peter (1970). “Understanding a Primitive Society”, in Rationality, ed. by B. R. Wilson, Harper.
Details
| Journal Section | Makaleler |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | April 30, 2017 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2017 Issue: 2 - 2017 |