Fransa’da Değişen Siyasal Paradigma Çerçevesinde Radikal Solun Yükselişi

Abstract

2007-2008 finansallaşmış kapitalist krizin patlak vermesinin ardından Avrupa’da birçok hükümet, kriz yönetim stratejisi olarak kemer sıkmayı benimsemiştir. Ancak kemer sıkma, erken beklentilerin aksine, iktisadi ve sosyal durumu ağırlaştırarak birçok ülkede geleneksel siyasi ayarları alt üst etmiştir. Özellikle Güney Avrupa’da bu siyasi krizin izlerini sürmek mümkün olmakla birlikte, gelişmiş kapitalist bir ülke olmasına rağmen Fransa’da meydana gelen siyasi paradigma değişikliği, oldukça istisnai bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Bu bağlamda kemer sıkma çağında Fransa’da radikal sol FG ve FI ile radikal sağ FN, sırasıyla, PS ve UMP’nin ulusal parti sistemi üzerindeki hegemonyasını sona erdirmiştir. Ne var ki radikal aktörlerin eş zamanlı yükselişine rağmen literatürde ilkine yönelik ilgi zayıf düzeyde kalmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makalede, Fransız solunda son yıllarda belirgin hale gelen yeniden gruplaşma eğiliminin temel nedenleri analiz edilmektedir. Spesifik olarak, yapısal politik ekonomik koşullar, toplumsal hareketlilik ve toplumsal protesto dinamikleri ile politik kurumsal koşulların sol rekabete etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Araştırmada PS’nin 1990’larda Üçüncü Yol akımına eklemlenmesinin ardından geleneksel programına yabancılaşarak yükselen krizlere yanıt verememesi ile Hollande döneminde ana akım kriz yönetim stratejisine eklemlenerek kemer sıkma politikaları izlemesinin radikal sol partilerin yükselişini tetiklediği savunulmaktadır. Bununla birlikte kemer sıkma karşıtı zayıf toplumsal hareketlilik ile FN’nin kamusal söylemi tayin eder hale gelmesi, söz konusu aktörlerin seçim başarılarını kayda değer biçimde sınırlandırmıştır.

Keywords

• Fransa,Sol Cephe,sosyal demokrasi,radikal sol partiler,kemer sıkma

The Rise of Radical Left within the Framework of Changing Political Paradigm in France

Abstract

Following the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financialized capitalist crisis, many governments in Europe adopted the austerity as a crisis management strategy. However, contrary to early expectations, the austerity deteriorated economic and social situation, bringing about dramatic changes in traditional political settings of many countries. Although it is plausible to trace this political crisis especially in Southern Europe, the recent political paradigm change in France, as a developed capitalist country, represents a very exceptional case. In the age of austerity, French radical left FG and FI, and radical right FN, respectively, ended the hegemony of PS and UMP on national party system. However, despite the simultaneous rise of radical actors, the rise of the former has been largely ignored in the literature. Therefore, in this article, the main reasons behind the regroupment of the French left, which became evident in recent years, have been analyzed. Specifically, the effects of structural political economic conditions, social mobilization, social protest dynamics and political institutional conditions on left competition will be discussed. It is argued that the failure of PS to respond rising crises by alienating its traditional program with the Third Way movement and its integration to mainstream crisis management strategy by implementing austerity policies in the Hollande period triggered the electoral ascent of radical left. However, at the same, the presence of weak anti-austerity social mobilization as well as FN’s dominance on public discourse have significantly limited the electoral success of the aforementioned actors.

Keywords

• France,Left Front,social democracy,radical left parties,austerity

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