TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE JUDICIARY IN EUROPEAN UNION'
Abstract
This study aims to make a typological analysis on the European Court of Justice. Since the issue has an expansive property, it has been narrowed by keeping it within the limits of a game-theoretical approach. The game is a Bayesian Game and it has three players. The main understanding of the thesis is much concerned with legislature, executive and constitutional juridical bodies. The inter-action of players vice versa effects the structure of strategy profile for each player. The determination of strategy profiles is an outcome for the game. The conclusion is a typology for the European Court of Justice acting as a constitutional court. The main structure of the study built on theories by Thomas Bayes, John F. Nash, John Harsanyi, Joseph HH Weiler and Barry Weingast.
Keywords
References
- Schepel, Harm and Blankenburg, Erhard (200 1 ). "Mobilizing the European Court of Justice" in Weiler, JHH and De Burca G. (Eds). The European Court of Justice.
- Vanberg, George (200 1 ). "Legislative-Judicial Relations: A GameTheoretic Approach to Constitutional Review". American Journal of Political Science, Vol.45. April, No.2.
Details
Primary Language
English
Subjects
-
Journal Section
Research Article
Authors
Erdem Mutlu
This is me
Publication Date
December 28, 2007
Submission Date
August 15, 2007
Acceptance Date
-
Published in Issue
Year 2007 Volume: 15 Number: 2