TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE JUDICIARY IN EUROPEAN UNION'
Öz
This study aims to make a typological analysis on the European Court of Justice. Since the issue has an expansive property, it has been narrowed by keeping it within the limits of a game-theoretical approach. The game is a Bayesian Game and it has three players. The main understanding of the thesis is much concerned with legislature, executive and constitutional juridical bodies. The inter-action of players vice versa effects the structure of strategy profile for each player. The determination of strategy profiles is an outcome for the game. The conclusion is a typology for the European Court of Justice acting as a constitutional court. The main structure of the study built on theories by Thomas Bayes, John F. Nash, John Harsanyi, Joseph HH Weiler and Barry Weingast.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynakça
- Schepel, Harm and Blankenburg, Erhard (200 1 ). "Mobilizing the European Court of Justice" in Weiler, JHH and De Burca G. (Eds). The European Court of Justice.
- Vanberg, George (200 1 ). "Legislative-Judicial Relations: A GameTheoretic Approach to Constitutional Review". American Journal of Political Science, Vol.45. April, No.2.
Ayrıntılar
Birincil Dil
İngilizce
Konular
-
Bölüm
Araştırma Makalesi
Yazarlar
Erdem Mutlu
Bu kişi benim
Yayımlanma Tarihi
28 Aralık 2007
Gönderilme Tarihi
15 Ağustos 2007
Kabul Tarihi
-
Yayımlandığı Sayı
Yıl 2007 Cilt: 15 Sayı: 2