ENRON OLAYI’NI DOĞRU OKUMAK-II: KISSADAN HİSSELER

Year 2012, Issue: 38, 85 - 106, 01.11.2012

Şenol Kandemir Canol Kandemir

Abstract

Hileler içeren muhasebe skandalları dünya çapında yaşanan bir olgu durumuna gelmiştir. 2001 yılında ABD’deyaşanan Enron skandalı bu çerçevede çığır açan tarihî bir olay olmuştur. ABD’de yaşanan Enron olayının dahasonra Parmalat 2003 skandalı gibi benzerleri Avrupa’da da meydana gelmiştir. Enron olayında aslî ve olağanfailler üst yöneticiler ve bağımsız denetçiler olarak teşhis edildiği için gösterilen tepkiler bunlara yönelmiştir.Hâlbuki söz konusu olayda suç ortakları sadece birkaç kişi ya da kurum değildir, derecesi farklı olmakla birlikte neredeyse kurumsal yönetimin ve hatta malî sistemin bütün bileşenleri kusurlu görünmektedir. Bu nedenle,gelişme düzeyi ve piyasalarının derinliği açısından henüz ABD ve AB’nin gerisinde olan Türkiye’de Enronskandalı benzeri bir olayın yaşanmaması için bu olayı doğru analiz edip belirli sonuçlar ve dersler çıkarmak yararlı olacaktır. Olayda sadece belirli kişi ya da kurumları gören bakış açısı ile hareket edildiğinde ABD ya daAB’de yapılanları taklit etmek ve ülkeye aktarmak yeterli olabilecektir, ancak olaya sistemik bir başarısızlık olarak bakıldığında sorunun nedenlerine yönelik bir yaklaşımla finansal bilgi kullanıcılarının ve tüm kamunun üzerine düşen ödevler olduğu kabul edilecektir. Bu çalışmada bir Enron Türkiye olayı yaşanmaması için günah keçileri konumundaki üst yönetici ve bağımsız denetçilerin yanı sıra olayın meydana gelebileceği iktisadî ve malîsistemin kusurlarının da düzeltilmesi gerektiği savunulmaktadır

Keywords

Enron dersleri, kurumsal yönetim, muhasebe hileleri, Sarbanes-Oxley yasası, etik

THE REAL ENRON SCANDAL-II : LESSONS FROM THE ENRON SCANDAL

Abstract

Accounting scandals involving frauds have been a worldwide phenomenon. In this framework, the Enron debacle 2001 which took place in USA has been regarded a landmark and historic event. Some events similar to“Enron America” were experienced in Europe in the following years such as Parmalat 2003 . Since the principal and usual suspects of this event was widely regarded as the top management and the auditing firms, theycast all doubts on themselves. However, in such an event the accomplices were not only certain individuals orinstitutions, but almost all mechanisms of corporate governance and even all agents of the economic and financial system seemed to be responsible for this scandal though they differ in their contributions to fraud incidents.Some researchers who believe the Enron scandal to be an individual case may find enough to accuse only some of them for the resulting losses and copy American or European practices to prevent similar scandals, butwhen such an event was regarded as a systematic failure the whole public should more or less undertake proportional responsibilities. Not to experience a Turkish Enron scandal in the near future, all measures to be taken and all regulations to be made have to take shortcomings and deficiencies of the economic and financialsystem into consideration in addition to those of the usual scapegoats

Keywords

Enron lessons, corporate governance, accounting frauds, Sarbanes-Oxley act, ethics

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