ULUSLARARASI HUKUKTA ÖZEL ASKERİ ŞİRKETLER VE HESAP VEREBİLİRLİK KRİZİ: ATFEDİLEBİLİRLİKTEN KÜRESEL İDARİ DENETİME

Abstract

Geleneksel uluslararası hukuka göre egemenliğin önemli unsurlarından biri devletin şiddet kullanımında tekel olmasıdır. Ancak zamanla gelişen teknoloji, silahlar ve hibrit hale gelen çatışma ortamı devletin sahip olduğu şiddet kullanımı üzerindeki meşru kontrolünü özel askeri şirketler aracılığıyla taşeronlaştırmasına yol açmıştır. Blackwater ve Wagner gibi özel askeri şirketler, devletlerin amaçlarına ulaşmada ‘makul reddedilebilirlik’ kalkanı altında kullanılan stratejik araçlar haline gelmiştir. Bu durum ‘atfedilebilirlik’ kriterlerini bu karmaşık yapılar karşısında yetersiz bırakarak hesap verebilirlik bakımından sistemde boşluk oluşturmaktadır. Bu boşluk özellikle çatışma alanlarındaki mağdur sivil halkın adalete erişmesi noktasında büyük engellerle karşılaşmasına neden olmaktadır. Bu makale, özel askeri şirketlerin faaliyetlerinden doğan sorumluluk boşluğunu devletin pozitif özen yükümlülüğü perspektifi üzerinden incelemektedir. Çalışmada, devlet sorumluluğunun yalnızca ihlallerin devlete atfedilip atfedilemeyeceği sorusuna indirgenemeyeceği; aynı zamanda devletlerin bu şirketleri denetleme, düzenleme ve ihlalleri önleme yükümlülükleri kapsamında değerlendirilmesi gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda makalede Blackwater ve Wagner örneklerinin karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilerek mevcut atfedilebilirlik durumunun sınırları ortaya konulmuştur. Makale, çözüm olarak yeni kurumlar ya da denetim mekanizmalar oluşturmayı değil Montreux Belgesi ve Uluslararası Davranış Kuralları Birliği (International Code of Conduct-ICoCA) standartları gibi mevcut yumuşak hukuk araçlarının iç idari hukuk ve ulusal ruhsatlandırma mekanizmaları aracılığıyla sertleştirilmesini önermektedir.

Keywords

• Özel Askeri Şirketler
• Devlet Sorumluluğu
• Küresel İdari Denetim Mekanizmaları
• Hesap Verebilirlik
• Özen Yükümlülüğü.

PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES and THE ACCOUNTABILITY CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM ATTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

According to traditional international law, a key element of sovereignty is the state's monopoly on the use of violence. However, the development of technology, weapons, and the hybrid nature of conflicts has led to the outsourcing of legitimate state control over the use of violence through private military companies. Private military companies like Blackwater and Wagner have become strategic tools used by states to achieve their goals under the shield of 'reasonable deniability'. This situation renders the 'attributability' criteria insufficient in the face of these complex structures, creating a gap in the system in terms of accountability. This gap particularly causes significant obstacles for the victimized civilian population in conflict zones in accessing justice. This article examines the accountability gap arising from the activities of private military companies from the perspective of the state's positive duty of care. The study argues that state responsibility cannot be reduced solely to the question of whether violations can be attributed to the state; it must also be considered within the scope of states' obligations to supervise, regulate, and prevent violations by these companies. Accordingly, the article comparatively analyzes the examples of Blackwater and Wagner to reveal the limits of the current attributability situation. The article proposes not creating new institutions or oversight mechanisms as a solution, but rather strengthening existing soft law tools such as the Montreux Convention and International Code of Conduct (ICoCA) standards through domestic administrative law and national licensing mechanisms.

Keywords

• Private Military Companies
• State Responsibility
• Global Administrative Oversight Mechanisms
• Accountability
• Due Diligence.

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