This paper attempts to lay bare the problematic consequences of Descartes’ attempt to define the mind as a thinking subject. Descartes’ substance dualism creates one of the central problems in the contemporary philosophy of mind. Descartes considers the mind to be a thinking substance. His conception of the “substantial mind” is often challenged by contemporary philosophers of mind, and their criticism tends to focus especially on the mind‑body problem, which of course is an ontological problem. In this regard, I will provide a critical examination of the cogito argument, which can in large measure be identified with Descartes’ theory of the mind. In drawing a sharp distinction between the mind and the body, Descartes renders their interaction unexplainable. A second problem concerns the question of what, precisely, consciousness is in the context of this argument. According to Descartes, the essential attribute of the mind is thinking, and he therefore employs the term ‘thinking’ to refer to various phenomena, all of which can be identified with consciousness. This is because thinking presupposes consciousness. Descartes’ conception of the nature of the mind shows that he considers consciousness to be the identity of thinking. It can be concluded from Descartes’ remarks that the mind is not a separate self but rather the unity of all mental states.
Primary Language | Turkish |
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Subjects | Philosophy |
Journal Section | Research/Review Articles |
Authors | |
Publication Date | December 30, 2019 |
Acceptance Date | December 16, 2019 |
Published in Issue | Year 2019 Volume: 2 Issue: 2 |