Ticaret Savaşları: ABD, Meksika, Çin Örnekleri

Year 2023, Issue: 120, 175 - 202, 16.10.2023

Serkan Şengül

https://doi.org/10.33203/mfy.1299918

Abstract

Bu çalışma, giderek daha sık gündeme gelen ticaret savaşlarını ve olası makroekonomik etkilerini ABD, Çin ve Meksika örnekleri üzerinden varsayımsal bir yaklaşımla analiz etmektedir. Bu analizde kullanılan üç ana senaryo ve misilleme davranışı, ABD'nin tek taraflı olarak ticaret savaşı başlatması, taraflar arasında iki taraflı bir ticaret savaşı ve Nash dengesine uygun bir optimal dengedir. Çalışmanın ana sonuçları, herhangi bir refah kazancına değil, aksine büyük refah kayıplarına yol açacağıdır. Ayrıca, bir ticaret savaşında daha büyük ekonomiye sahip olan tarafın nispeten kazançlı çıkabileceği ve Nash dengesinin sağladığı optimum dengenin toplam refah kaybını en aza indiren senaryo olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Keywords

Ticaret Savaşları, Optimal Denge, Nash, Korumacılık

Trade Wars: The Cases of USA, Mexico, China

Abstract

This paper analyzes trade wars and their potential macroeconomic effects with a hypothetical approach through the cases of the US, China and Mexico. The three main scenarios and retaliatory behaviors used in this analysis are the unilateral launch of a trade war by the US, a bilateral trade war between the parties, and an optimal equilibrium in line with the Nash equilibrium. The main conclusions of the study are that it would not lead to any welfare gains, but rather to large welfare losses. Also, the optimum equilibrium provided by Nash equilibrium is the scenario that minimizes the total welfare loss.

Keywords

Trade wars, Optimal tariffs, Nash, Protectionism

References

• Akçadağ-Alagöz, E. (2016). Ekonomik Karşılıklı Bağımlılık Kapsamında AB-Çin İlişkileri, U.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Vol: 9, No: 2, 33-56.
• Aran, B. (2018). ABD, Çin, Ticaret Savaşları ve Türkiye, Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı (TEPAV), Assestment Paper, No: N201813, 1-6.
• Bagwell, K., Staiger, R. W. (1999). An Economic Theory of GATT, American Economic Review, Vol. 89 (1), 215–248.
• Bagwell, K., Staiger, R.W. (2016). Handbook of Commercial Policy, North Holland, Amsterdam.
• Balistreri, E.J., Hillberry, R.H. (2017). 21st Century Trade Wars, Working Paper, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/8809.pdf
• Baumol, W.J., Blinder, A.S. (1985). Economic Principles and Policy, 3rd Edition, Harcourt, San Diego.
• Baybatlı, Ş. And Doğan, B. Ö. (2021). An Empirical Analysis on the Economic Reflections of Trade Wars: USA-China Case, Yalova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi,11(1), 17-36.
• Bchir, M. H., Decreux, Y. Guerin, J.L., Jean, S. (2002). MIRAGE, a Computable General Equilibrium Model for Trade Policy Analysis, CEPII, Working Paper No 2002-17.
• Bouet, A, Laborde, D. (2010). Assessing the Potential Cost of a Failed Doha, World Trade Review, Vol. 9, 319-351.
• Bouet, A. and Laborde, D. (2017). US Trade Wars with Emerging Countries in the 21st Century: Make America and Its Partners Lose Again, IFPRI Discussion Paper, No: 01669, Washington, DC.
• Brander, J. and Spencer, R. (1985). Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, Journal of International Economics, Vol.18, 83-100.
• Campbell, W. K. and Miller, J. K. (2007). International Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences, (2ND ED.), Cengage Learning, London.
• CIA (2017). The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
• Conybeare, J. A. (1987). Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry, Columbia University Press, New York.
• Costinot, A., and Rodriguez-Clare, A. (2014). Trade theory with numbers, Handbook of International Economics, Vol.4, 211-224.
• Dorius, S. Y. and Xie, Y. (2022). Americans’ Attitudes toward the US–China Trade War, Journal of Contemporary China, 31:133, 17-37
• Eaton, J. and Grossman, G. (1986). Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly, Quarterly Journal of Econonmics, Vol. 101, 383-406.
• Ertürk, N. (2017). Ticaret Savaşları ve Dünya Ekonomisine Etkileri, Fiscaoeconomia, 1(2), 88-112.
• Felicio, R. (2018). Trade Wars: When Nash Equilibrium Meets Deglobalization, http://cattolicaglobalmarketsmagazine.com/2018/03/26/trade-wars-nash-equilibrium-meets-deglobalization/
• Grossman, G. and Maggi, G. (1997). Free Trade versus Strategic Trade, a Peek into Pandora’s Box, NBER Working Paper: 6211.
• GTAP (2018). GTAP Data Bases, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/contribute/default.asp
• Hamilton, B. and Whalley, J. (1983). Optimal Tariff Calculations in Alternative Trade Models and Some Possible Implications for Current World Trading Arrangements, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 15 (4), 323-348.
• Irwin, D. A. (1991). Retrospectives: Challenges to Free Trade, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 201-209.
• ITA (2017). Data & Analysis: International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce, https://www.trade.gov/data.asp
• Kennan, J. and Riezman, R. (1988). Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?, International Economic Review, Vol. 29 (1), 81-85.
• Küçükaksoy, İ. (2010). Deregülasyon, Dış Ticaret Hadleri ve Refah İlişkileri, e-Journal of New World Sciences Academy, 5(2), 133-157.
• Nash, J. (1951). Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286–295.
• OECD (2017). Trade in Value-Added database, www.oecd.org/industry/ind/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-wtojointinitiative.html
• Ossa, R. (2014). Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data, American Economic Review, Vol. 104 (12), 4104-4146.
• Seyidoğlu, H. (2009). Uluslararası İktisat Teori Politika ve Uygulama, Güzem Can Yayınları, İstanbul.
• Spencer, B. (1986). What Should Trade Policy Target?, P. Krugman(revised), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, Cambridge: MIT Press, 23-46.
• Şanlı, O. And Ateş, İ. (2020). ABD – Çin Odalı Ticaret ve Kur Savaşlarının Dünya Ekonomisi Üzerindeki Etkileri, Aydın Adnan Menderes University Journal of Institute of Social Science, 7(1), 75-101.
• Tekbaş, M. and Yıldırım, M. (2016). G-8 Ülkelerinde Yeni Korumacılık Politikaları, Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Yıl: 3, Sayı: 9, 456-479.
• Tucker, J. (2016). Trump’s 35 percent tariff wouldn’t keep jobs in the U.S. Here’s why, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/08/trumps-35-percent-tariff-wouldnt-keep-jobs-in-the-u-s-heres-why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.627768e0bc47
• Uysal, G. (2017). Nash Dengesi, Konferans Bildirgesi, Nash Dengesi ve Belirsizlik Altında Karar Verme Konferansı, Mart, 2017, İstanbul.
• Ünay, S. and Dilek, Ş. (2018). Yeni Korumacılık ve Ticaret Savaşları, SETA Analiz, Sayı: 228, SETA Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı, İstanbul.
• WTO (2017). Members and Observers, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
• WTO (2018). Trade Profile, USA - China, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US%2cCN