The Relationship Between Political Turnover and Sovereign Debt in Turkey

Year 2020, Volume: 16 Issue: 30, 3110 - 3133, 31.10.2020

Mehmet Ela

https://doi.org/10.26466/opus.702552

Abstract

Political turnover (government change) affects many socio-economic and fiscal factors. One of the factors affected by the political turnover is the sovereign debt indicators. The political turnover is related to the indicators of sovereign debt as it causes uncertainty about which party will come into power. In this regard, four sovereign debt indicators related to political turnover were identified in the study. These indicators consist of debt level (general government debt / GDP), debt crisis (crisis years), debt default (default years) and the country's credibility (credit ratings). The study adopted a discursive method supported with graphs and analyzed the relationship of political turnover and debt indicators between the years of 1960-2019 for Turkey. According to the result of the study; (i) After the period of intense political turnover, level of debt increases in Turkey. In periods of political stability, debt level decreases. (ii) After the period of intense political turnover, the debt crises are experienced in Turkey and after the debt crisis, political stability prevails. This situation can be interpreted as the society wants political stability after the debt crisis. (iii) In Turkey, after years of intense political turnover, there is an increase in the number of debt defaults. In the period of default or after the default, political stability is experienced. (iv) Political turnover negatively affects credit ratings in Turkey, but the effect is limited.

Keywords

Government change, sovereign debt indicators, public administration, public debt management, Turkey

Türkiye’de Politik Devir ve Devlet Borçları İlişkisi

Abstract

Politik devir (iktidar değişimi), birçok sosyoekonomik ve mali faktörü etkilemektedir. Politik devrin etkilediği faktörlerden bir tanesi ise devlet borç göstergeleridir. Politik devir, devlet yönetimine hangi partinin geleceği konusunda belirsizliğe yol açtığından, devlet borçlarına ilişkin göstergelerle ilişkilidir. Bu açıdan, çalışmada politik devirle ilişkili dört devlet borç göstergesi belirlenmiştir. Bu göstergeler, borç düzeyi (genel devlet borcu/GSYİH), borç krizi (kriz yılları), borç temerrüdü (temerrüt yılları) ve ülkenin kredibilitesinden (kredi notları) oluşmaktadır. Çalışmada grafiklerle desteklenen söylemsel bir yöntem benimsenmiş ve Türkiye için 1960-2019 yılları arasında, politik devir ve borç göstergeleri ilişkisi analiz edilmiştir. Çalışmanın sonucuna göre; (i) Türkiye’de yoğun politik devrin yaşandığı dönemlerin ardından borç düzeyi artışa geçmektedir. Politik istikrarın görüldüğü dönemlerde ise borç düzeyleri düşmektedir. (ii) Türkiye’de yoğun politik devrin ardından borç krizi yaşanmakta, krizin ardından ise politik istikrar hüküm sürmektedir. Bu durum toplumun borç krizinin ardından siyasi istikrar istediği şeklinde yorumlanabilmektedir. (iii) Türkiye’de yoğun politik devrin yaşandığı yılların ardından temerrüt sayılarında artış görülmektedir. Temerrüt yıllarında veya temerrüdün ardından ise, nispeten siyasi istikrar yaşanmaktadır. (iv) Türkiye’de politik devir kredi derecelerini olumsuz etkilemektedir ancak etki sınırlıdır.

Keywords

İktidar değişimi, devlet borç göstergeleri, kamu yönetimi, kamu borç yönetimi, Türkiye

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