FORMEL MANTIK, ENFORMEL USLAMLAMA VE BUNLARIN TARTIŞMALI BAĞI

Year 2024, Issue: 64, 325 - 337, 20.09.2024

Mustafa Polat

https://doi.org/10.30794/pausbed.1464096

Abstract

Doğal dillerde temsil kazanan gündelik uslamlama pratiklerimizin -yani, enformel akıl yürütme örneklerinin- genellikle formel sentaks, formel semantik ve ispat sisteminden oluşan formel bir çıkarım sistemi -yani formel mantık- tarafından tatmin edici bir şekilde haritalandırılabileceğine inanırız. Ancak, formel mantığın enformel akıl yürütme ile olan bu gösterim ilişkisinin hangi zeminde meşruiyet kazandığını sormak önemlidir. Standart bir görüşe göre; formel mantık, enformel akıl yürütmenin rasyonel olarak kabul edilebilir tüm örneklerini yönetir. Bu görüş-betimleyici ya da normatif yorumuyla- Gilbert Harman ve Peter Wason tarafından ciddi bir şekilde sorgulanmış ve her ikisi de formel mantığın enformel akıl yürütme süreçleri ile (betimleyici/normatif anlamda) bir alakası olmadığını savunmuştur. Bu makalede, standart görüşe karşı argümanların eleştirel bir incelemesi sunulurken standart görüş mantıksal çoğulculuk perspektifinden yeniden okunacaktır. Makalede tartışılacağı üzere, birinci dereceden klasik dedüktif mantık sistemi gibi tekil bir biçimsel ispat sistemi bir başına standart görüşü karşılayamaz.

Keywords

FORMEL MANTIK, ENFORMEL USLAMLAMA, NORMATİFLİK, SEÇİM TESTİ, MANTIKSAL ÇOĞULCULUK

FORMAL LOGIC, INFORMAL REASONING, AND THEIR DISPUTABLE RELEVANCE

Abstract

Our commonplace practices of reasoning in natural languages-i.e. informal reasoning- are often believed to satisfactorily map on a formal system of logic-i.e. formal logic- which typically consists of formal syntax, formal semantics, and related proof system. Nonetheless, it then becomes significant to ask on what grounds formal logic legitimately has such relevance to informal reasoning. On one standard view, formal logic governs all rationally admissible tokens of informal reasoning. This view – either in its descriptive or normative construal - has been seriously challenged by Gilbert Harman and Peter Wason who commonly hold that formal logic has no (descriptive/normative) relevance to informal reasoning. This paper provides a critical survey of these distinct accounts, narrowing down the scope of their common thesis based on the possibility of logical pluralism. As it argues, a singular formal system of proof such as classical first-order deductive logic cannot single-handedly satisfy the standard view.

Keywords

Formal Logic, Informal Reasoning, Normativity, The Selection Task, Logical Pluralism

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