Adım Adım Barış: ABD-Merkezli Orta Doğu Düzeninin Kuruluşu, 1973-1975

Abstract

Bu makale, 1973-1977 döneminde Henry Kissinger’ın yönlendirdiği ABD Ortadoğu politi-kasının, kademeli ikili diplomasi, zorlayıcı bağlantı (linkage) ve diplomatik forumların sıkı kontrolü yoluyla realist bir grand stratejiyi nasıl hayata geçirdiğini incelemektedir. Çalışmanın temel sorusu, Kissinger’ın 1973 sonrası Ortadoğu diplomasisinin tutarlı bir grand strateji oluşturup oluşturmadığı ve bu stratejinin Amerikan liderliğindeki bölgesel düzenin inşasına nasıl katkıda bulunduğudur. Kuramsal çerçeve, Silove’un grand planlar, grand ilkeler ve grand davranış ayrımına ve Brands’in amaçlar araçlar yöntemler yaklaşımına dayanmaktadır; ayrıca ABD hegemonyası, düzen kurma ve eleştirel/post kolonyal yaklaşımlar hakkındaki tartışmalarla diyalog kurmaktadır. Yöntemsel olarak makale, Ekim 1973 Arap-İsrail Savaşı sonrasındaki kritik dönemi, kuram yönlendirmeli nitel süreç izleme yöntemiy-le analiz etmektedir. Dış İlişkiler Serisi (FRUS) ciltleri ve başkanlık kütüphanelerinden temin edilen gizliliği kaldırılmış belgeler, ABD Genel Muhasebe Ofisi (GAO) raporları, dönemin basın haberleri ve ikincil literatür birlikte kullanılarak, ABD politikasına dair rakip açıklamalar “hoop”, “smoking gun” ve “straw in the wind” testleriyle sınanmaktadır. Ampirik analiz, Mısır’ın 1973 sonrasındaki yeniden yönelişi ve 1974-1975 ayrıştırma anlaşmaları, İran ve Suudi Arabistan’dan oluşan “ikiz sütunlar” üzerinden Körfez’de kurulan ABD ağırlıklı güvenlik mimarisi ve Kissinger tarzı stratejik kalıpların 2025’e kadar sürege-len etkisi üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bulgular, Kissinger’ın yaklaşımının küresel realist bir grand planı, bölgede barıştan önce düzeni önceleyen bir grand davranış biçimine çevir-diğini göstermektedir. Arap–İsrail alanında kademeli ayrıştırma anlaşmaları, ABD’nin forum kontrolü ve Filistin meselesinin kasıtlı ertelenmesi istikrarlı fakat kısmi bir düzen yaratmıştır. Körfez’de İran’a yönelik esnek silah transferleri, Suudi Arabistan ile kurumsal-laşan ekonomik karşılıklı bağımlılık ve Diego Garcia’nın denizaşırı bir üs olarak geliştirilmesi, kırılgan bir hegemonik güvenlik sistemi ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu düzen, bir yandan ABD üstünlüğünü pekiştirirken, diğer yandan Filistin’in self determinasyonu ve Körfez rejimlerinin meşruiyeti gibi temel sorunları ertelemiştir. Makale, Kissinger’ın grand stratejisinin hem etkili bir nüfuz sürdürme repertuvarı sunduğunu hem de istikrarı ve büyük güç yönetimini kapsayıcı barışın önüne koymanın uzun vadeli maliyetlerine dair uyarıcı bir örnek teşkil ettiğini savunmaktadır.

Keywords

• Henry Kissinger
• Ortadoğu
• ABD Hegemonyası
• Grand Strateji
• Arap-İsrail Çatışması

Step by Step Peace the Construction of a US-Centered Middle East Order, 1973-1975

Abstract

This article examines how U.S. Middle East policy between 1973 and 1977, under Henry Kissinger’s guidance, implemented a realist grand strategy through incremental step by step bilateral diplomacy, coercive linkage, and tight control of diplomatic forums. It asks whether Kissinger’s post 1973 diplomacy constituted a coherent grand strategy and how it contributed to the construction of an enduring American led regional order. Conceptually, the study draws on Silove’s distinction between grand plans, grand principles, and grand behavior and on Brands’s ends–ways–means understanding of grand strategy, while engaging debates on U.S. hegemony, order building, and critical perspectives on American power in the Middle East. Methodologically, the article employs theory guided qualitative process tracing of key episodes after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Using declassified U.S. archives (FRUS volumes and presidential libraries), U.S. General Accounting Office re-ports, contemporary media, and scholarly works, it applies hoop, smoking gun, and straw in the wind tests to competing explanations of U.S. policy. The empirical analysis focuses on Egypt’s post 1973 realignment and the 1974-1975 disengagement agreements, the consolidation of U.S. predominance in the Persian Gulf through the “twin pillars” of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the persistence of Kissingerian patterns in later U.S. policies up to 2025. The findings show that Kissinger’s approach translated a global realist grand plan into regional grand behavior that privileged order over comprehensive peace. In the Arab–Israeli arena, step by step disengagement accords, American forum control, and the deliberate deferral of the Palestinian question created a stable but partial order. In the Gulf, permissive arms transfer to Iran, institutionalized economic interdependence with Saudi Arabia, and the development of Diego Garcia as an offshore hub produced a durable but fragile hegemonic security system. Together, these arrangements entrenched U.S. primacy yet postponed fundamental issues such as Palestinian self determination and the political legitimacy of Gulf regimes. The article concludes that Kissinger’s grand strategy offers both a sophisticated repertoire for sustaining influence and a cautionary example of the long term costs of prioritizing stability and great power management over inclusive peace.

Keywords

• Henry Kissinger
• Middle East
• U.S. Hegemony
• Grand Strateji
• Arab-Israeli Conflict

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