Kayıt Dışı Ekonominin Mali Kökenlerinin Panel Eşik Modeli ile İncelenmesi: Düzenlemelerin Etkinliği Bağlamında Kamu Kesimi Büyüklüğünün Etkisi

Year 2021, , 141 - 158, 25.01.2021

Nazmiye Tekdemir , Pelin Varol İyidoğan

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.01.07

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Bu çalışmanın iki temel amacı bulunmaktadır. Çalışmada ilk olarak; 2000-2017 yılları için 26 Avrupa ülkesinde kayıt dışılığın mali belirleyicilerinin doğrusal bir yaklaşımla ortaya konulması hedeflenmektedir. Buradan elde edilen bulgular çerçevesinde ikinci olarak; mali değişkenlerden kamu kesimi büyüklüğünün kayıt dışı ekonomi üzerindeki etkisinin düzenlemelerin etkinliğine göre ayrılmış iki ayrı rejimde panel eşik modeli ile incelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Elde edilen bulgulara göre, düzenleme etkinliği eşik değerin altında iken, kamu kesimi büyüklüğünün kayıt dışı ekonomi üzerinde anlamlı bir etkisi ortaya çıkmamaktadır. Buna karşın düzenleme etkinliğinin görece daha yüksek olduğu ikinci rejimde söz konusu etkinin anlamlı ve negatif olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır.

Keywords

Kayıt Dışı Ekonomi, Kamu Kesimi Büyüklüğü, Düzenlemeler, Panel Eşik Modeli

The Examination of Fiscal Origins of Black Economy by Panel Threshold Model: The Effect of Government Size within the Context of Regulation Efficiency

Abstract

The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, we aim to examine the fiscal determinants of the black economy for 26 economies over 2000-2017 by utilizing a linear approach. Secondly, in parallel to the linear model findings, we seek to investigate the impact of government size on the black economy under two regimes with different regulation efficiencies using a panel threshold model. Our results indicate that government size has no significant effect on the black economy when the regulation efficiency is below the threshold level. On the other hand, when the government regulations are relatively more efficient, we find evidence supporting the significant and negative impact of government size on the black economy.

Keywords

Black Economy, Government Size, Regulations, Panel Threshold Model

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