Millianism, Empty Names and The No-Proposition View

Year 2023, , 136 - 150, 15.12.2023

Mustafa Polat

https://doi.org/10.55256/temasa.1344887

Abstract

Millianism fundamentally holds that the semantic content of a proper name is its referent. Respectively, it implies that an empty name has no semantic content. Given an orthodox sense of proposition-talk and the Fregean principle of compositionality, Millianism further entails a disputable view on the semantics of empty-name sentences- namely, the No-Proposition View (NPV)- which states that empty-name sentences express no proposition. Thereby, NPV further indicates that empty-name sentences fail to convey meaningful, truth-evaluable, and distinguishable contents. However, as commonly discussed, such a semantic construal of empty-name sentences seemingly contradicts our linguistic intuitions about empty-name sentences such as ‘Santa is Santa,’ ‘Santa doesn’t exist,’ and ‘Sherlock doesn’t exist’. This paper provides an extensive analysis of Millianism and NPV in the face of the semantic puzzles concerning the fundamental convictions behind NPV. In doing so, the paper intends to disclose the convictions leading Millianism to NPV so that it seeks to show how to rescue Millianism from the semantic puzzles in question. As a result, the paper concludes that NPV does not necessarily follow from a Millian thesis about the semantic value of proper names. Instead, it follows from certain convictions about the genuineness of proper names, the plausibility of non-referring names, the nature of propositions, and so on. As exemplified throughout the paper, it is thus fair to divorce Millianism from NPV by reconstruing the relevant convictions in one way or another.

Keywords

Millianism, Proper Names, Empty Names, Propositionalism, The No-Proposition View

Millianizm, Boş İsimler Ve Önerme-Yok Görüşü

Abstract

Millianizm; özel isimlerin semantik içeriklerinin bu isimlerin göndergeleri olduğunu söyler. Buna göre, göndergeden yoksun özel isimlerin -yani, boş isimlerin- semantik içerikleri yoktur. Önermelere dair standart söylev ile Fregeci bileşimsellik ilkesi emniyetli kabuller olarak varsayıldığında; Millianizm, boş-isim tümceleri hakkında (yani boş isimleri kategorematik öğeler olarak biçmen içeren düzgün kurallı tümceler hakkında) genellikle “Önerme-Yok Görüşü” (ÖYG) olarak adlandırılan şu görüşe eklemlenir: Boş isim tümceleri önerme ifade etmez. Bu görüşün sonucu olarak boş-isim tümceleri anlamlı, doğruluk-koşulsal ve ayırt edilebilir içerikler aktaramaz. Sıklıkla tartışıldığı üzere, bu sonuçlar dilsel sezgilerimizle ters düşmektedir; çünkü ‘Noel Baba yoktur’, ‘Sherlock Holmes yoktur’ ve ‘Noel Baba, Noel Baba’dır’ gibi tümceler semantik olarak anlamlı, doğruluk-koşulsal ve birbirlerinden ayırt edilebilir görünmektedir. Bu makale, Millianizm ile ilişkilendirilen ÖYG’nin yüzleştiği üç temel semantik sorunu (Anlam Sorunu, Doğruluk Sorunu ve Ayırt-edilebilirlik Sorunu) ile bu sorunların arkasında yatan temel kabulleri tahlil edecektir. Bu tahlillere göre, Millianizm- özel isimlere dair doğrudan göndergeci semantik bir teori olarak- ÖYG’yi zorunlu olarak gerektirmez; çünkü, ÖYG özel isimlerin gönderimsel işlev ve semantik değerlerine dair bir görüşün tekil ve mantıksal bir sonucu olmaktan ziyade boş isim, önerme ve bileşimsellik kavramlarına dair spesifik kabullerin müşterek bir sonucudur. Nitekim makalede örnekleneceği üzere; boş isimler, önermeler ve bileşimsellik kavramlarına dair farklı kabuller benimsemek Millianizmi ÖYG’nin getirdiği semantik sorunsallardan uzaklaştırmaktadır- öyle ki, pek çok filozof için bu kavramlara dair yeni yaklaşımlar sunmak Millianizmi ÖYG kaynaklı semantik sorunlara karşı savunmak için erişilebilir bir strateji haline gelmiştir.

Keywords

Millianizm, Özel İsimler, Boş İsimler, Önermeselcilik, Önerme-Yok Görüşü

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