İŞ GÜCÜ PİYASASINDA MONOPSON GÜCÜ: TEORİK BULGULAR VE POLİTİKA ÇIKARIMLARI

Abstract

Bu çalışma, iş gücü piyasalarında monopson gücünün ücretler, istihdam düzeyi ve refah üzerindeki etkilerini teorik açıdan incelemektedir. Klasik rekabetçi iş gücü piyasası modeli, ücretlerin işçilerin marjinal ürününe eşitlendiğini ve kaynak kullanımının etkin olduğunu varsayar. Ancak son yıllardaki araştırmalar, işverenlerin ücretleri belirleme gücüne sahip olduğunu ve bir firmanın daha fazla işçi çalıştırabilmek için daha yüksek ücret ödemek zorunda kaldığını göstermektedir; yani iş gücü arzı firma düzeyinde yukarı doğru eğimlidir. Bu durum, ücret baskılanması ve istihdam kaybı gibi sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Bu kapsamda çalışmada önce marjinal gelir = marjinal maliyet koşulu gibi teorik çerçeveler ele alınmakta, ardından arama ve eşleşme friksiyonları ile dinamik monopson yaklaşımları tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca asgari ücret ve sendikalaşma uygulamalarının refah üzerindeki etkileri değerlendirilmekte; bu faktörlerin monopson marjını sınırlayarak ücretleri yükseltebileceği, istihdamı artırabileceği ve toplumsal refahı iyileştirebileceği ortaya konmaktadır. Bulgular, uygun düzeyde belirlenmiş asgari ücretlerin monopson koşullarda ücretleri artırmakla kalmayıp monopson koşullarında ücretleri marjinal verimlilik düzeyine yaklaştırarak istihdamı da destekleyebilmektedir. Sendikalar ve toplu pazarlık mekanizmaları işçilerin pazarlık gücünü artırmakta, ücretleri marjinal verimliliğe yaklaştırmakta ve ücret baskısını sınırlandırabilmektedir. Sonuç olarak monopson yapısı yalnızca istisnai bir piyasa durumu olarak değil, günümüz iş gücü piyasalarının önemli ve yaygın bir özelliği olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Keywords

• Monopson
• İşgücü Piyasası
• Ücret Belirleme Gücü
• Asgari Ücret
• Emek Ekonomisi

THE MONOPSONY POWER IN THE LABOR MARKET: THEORETICAL FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Abstract

This study examines the effects of monopsony power in labor markets on wages, employment levels, and welfare from a theoretical perspective. The standard competitive labor market model assumes that wages are equal to workers’ marginal product and that resource allocation is efficient. However, recent research shows that employers possess wage-setting power and that firms must offer higher wages in order to attract additional workers; that is, labor supply at the firm level is upward sloping. This leads to wage suppression and employment losses. In this framework, the study first reviews the theoretical foundations such as the marginal revenue equals marginal cost condition, and then discusses search and matching frictions as well as dynamic monopsony approaches. In addition, the welfare effects of minimum wage policies and unionization are evaluated, showing that these factors can constrain the monopsony margin, increase wages, raise employment, and improve overall social welfare. The findings indicate that appropriately set minimum wages not only increase wages under monopsonistic conditions but can also raise employment by bringing wages closer to marginal productivity. Similarly, unions and collective bargaining mechanisms strengthen workers’ bargaining power, align wages more closely with marginal productivity, and reduce wage suppression. Overall, monopsony is not treated as an exceptional market structure but rather as a widespread and important feature of contemporary labor markets.

Keywords

• Monopsony
• Labor Market
• Wage-Setting Power
• Minimum Wage
• Labor Economics

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