International Peace Efforts in the Syrian Civil War: The ‘Inevitable’ Failure?
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to assess international negotiation efforts towards ending the civil war in Syria. Although many peace events have been organised since the beginning of the civil war, the existing literature has paid little attention to the impact of international peace efforts in ending the Syrian war. The article aims to close this gap by assessing major peace efforts between 2011 and 2019; The Arab League Peace Plan, the United Nations peace initiatives, and the Geneva, Vienna and Astana peace talks. It analyses these efforts through official reports and documents published by the UN, US, Republic of Turkey, UN Security Council, and members of peace initiatives. These documents are complemented by newspaper articles showing the official views of the regional and global actors as well as the key agents of the conflict. Therefore, the article reveals the reasons for the failure of these conflict resolution efforts. The Syrian government’s reluctance to end the conflict in a non-violent way, the armed groups’ dream of territorial gains and regional and global powers’ involvement in the conflict prevented the solution of the conflict. It utilises official negotiations and ripeness approaches to investigate the insights and contents of peace efforts. The article argues that the regional and global powers have acted as facilitators instead of mediators in the peace talks. It finds that even though these peace events are viewed as official negotiations, they are only pre-negotiation efforts.
Keywords
Syrian Civil War, Peace Efforts, International Negotiations, Conflict Resolution, United Nations
References
- Action Group for Syria. Final Communique, Arab League, June 30, 2012, 1-5.
- Arab League. Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012, Report No: 259.12D (2012).
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Tangled Web: The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications.” Mediterranean Quarterly 24, no.1 (February 2013): 1-11, doi: 10.1215/10474552-2018988.
- Coleman, Peter T. “Redefining Ripeness: A Social-psychological Perspective,” Peace and Conflict 3, no.1 (1997): 81-103.
- De Juan, Alexander and André Bank. “The Ba’athist Blackout? Selective Goods Provision and Political Violence in the Syrian Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no.1 (January 2015), 91-104, doi: 10.1177/0022343314559437.
- Druckman, Daniel. “Dimensions of International Negotiations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes.” Group Decision and Negotiation 6, no.5 (September 1997): 395-420.
- Erlich, Reese. Inside Syria. New York: Prometheus Books, 2016.
- Fisher, Roger and William L. Ury. Getting to Yes. London: Business Books, 1996.
- Fisher, Ronald R. “Coordination between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation.” International Negotiation 11, no.1, (January 2006): 65-89.
- Guelke, Adrian. “Negotiations and Peace Processes.” In Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, Peace Processes, edited by John Darby and Roger MacGinty, 63-77. New York: Macmillan, 2003.
