Terörle Mücadelede Dekapitasyonun İşlevsizliği ve Sonuçları: İran’da Cundullah Örneği

Abstract

Dekapitasyon, analojik bir yaklaşımla, terörle mücadelenin strateji evreninde terör örgütlerinin varlıklarının, hareket ve eylem kapasitelerinin sonlandırılması veya sınırlandırılması yönelik hedefi karşılayabilecek en önemli strateji olarak konumlandırılmaktadır. Öyle ki bu strateji, çoğunlukla ülkesel ve örgütsel farklılıkların göz ardı edildiği, verili işlevsellik varsayımı ve atfıyla imgelenmektedir. Bu imgelemenin temelinde ise dekapitasyonun terörle mücadelenin kuram ve stratejik evrenine taşınması etkili olan analojik yöntem yer almaktadır. Dekapitasyon, analojik açıdan, terörle mücadelede terör örgütlerini hareketsiz kılma ve hayatlarını sonlandırma varsayımına dayanan bir strateji olarak ele alınması, dekapitasyonun başarısızlığına ve işlevsizliğine dair perspektif ve açıklamaların yetersiz kalmasına büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilmesine neden olmaktadır. Terör örgütlerinin liderlerinin etkisiz hale getirilmesi durumunun, organizmanın baş bölümünün gövde kısmından ayrılması ile ilişkilendirilmesi, başarısızlık ve işlevsizlik bağlamında söz konusu analojik varsayımın ve bakışın sınırlarına işaret etmektedir. Dekapitasyon stratejisinin başarısızlıkla sonuçlanması, ilgili devlet açısından bir malpraktis durumu yaratabilmektedir. Bu durum terörle mücadele bağlamında temel motivasyon ve hedef olan “tehdidin ortadan kaldırılması” arayışının aksine, tehdidin varlığını sürdürdüğü, dönüştüğü ya da büyüdüğü bir süreçle karşı karşıya kalınması sonucunu doğurabilmektedir. Bu durum İran’ın Cundullah örgütüne yönelik olarak uyguladığı dekapitasyon stratejisinde ve dekapitasyon sonrası süreçte kendisini göstermiş ve örneklenmiştir.

Keywords

• Dekapitasyon
• Strateji
• İşlev
• Başarısızlık
• İran
• Cundullah

The Dysfunctionality and Consequences of Decapitation in the War on Terror: The Case of Jundullah in Iran

Abstract

In an analogical approach, decapitation is positioned as the most important strategy in the strategy universe of counter-terrorism that can meet the objective of terminating or limiting the existence, movement and action capacities of terrorist organisations. In fact, this strategy is often imagined with the assumption and attribution of a given functionality where national and organisational differences are ignored. At the basis of this imagery is the analogical method that has been effective in bringing decapitation into the theoretical and strategic universe of counter-terrorism. The analogical treatment of decapitation as a strategy in the fight against terrorism based on the assumption of immobilising terrorist organisations and ending their lives leads to the inadequacy of perspectives and explanations on the failure and dysfunctionality of decapitation, which are largely ignored. The association of the neutralisation of the leaders of terrorist organisations with the separation of the head from the body of the organism points to the limits of this analogical assumption and perspective in the context of failure and dysfunction. The failure of the decapitation strategy may create a malpractice situation for the state concerned. This may result in a process in which the threat persists, transforms or grows, as opposed to the main motivation and goal of ‘eliminating the threat’ in the context of counter-terrorism. This situation has been exemplified in Iran's decapitation strategy against the Jundullah organisation and in the post-decapitation process.

Keywords

• Decapitation
• Strategy
• Dysfunctionality
• Iran
• Jundallah

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