Contributions of Institutional Economics to Economic Thought

Abstract

It is seen that interest in the effects of human behavior on economic events and phenomena has been increasing in recent years. In this context, institutions where behaviors become a set of formal-informal rules that determine the boundaries of choice for the stakeholders of the society from thought to action and form the framework of individual action by gaining stability, are of great importance in terms of developing an economic thinking system compatible with the real world. With its dynamic perspective on economic events and phenomena, the institutional economic tradition has revealed important discoveries by evaluating the effects of institutions on the economic order from different perspectives and closed a major gap in this area. With this study, the historical adventure of institutional economics, which started with the pioneering studies that Thorstein B. Veblen put forward based on the Darwinian evolution approach, has been discussed from the perspective of old and new institutional economics. By presenting the contributions of the prominent representatives of the tradition to economic thought through labor included in the analysis, it is aimed to open a door from the perspective of institutionalized behavior to studies on the economic impact of human behavior. In addition, the evaluations for the sustainability of the institutional tradition were discussed, and the advantages and disadvantages of the tradition in question were emphasized within the framework of today's prevailing economic approach.

Keywords

• institutional economics
• economic thought
• economic approaches

Kurumsal İktisadın İktisadi Düşünceye Katkıları

Abstract

İnsan davranışlarının iktisadi olay ve olgular üzerindeki etkisine yönelik ilginin son yıllarda artarak devam ettiği görülmektedir. Bu kapsamda, davranışların istikrar kazanarak, düşünceden eyleme kadar, toplumun paydaşları için tercih sınırlarını belirleyen ve bireysel eylemin çerçevesini oluşturan formel-enformel kurallar seti halini aldığı kurumlar, gerçek dünya ile uyumlu bir iktisadi düşünce sistemi geliştirilebilmesi açısından büyük önem arz etmektedir. İktisadi olay ve olgulara yönelik dinamik bakış açısıyla kurumsal iktisadi gelenek, kurumların iktisadi düzen üzerindeki etkisini farklı açılardan değerlendirerek önemli keşifler ortaya koymuş ve bu alanda büyük bir açığı kapatmıştır. Bu çalışma ile Thorstein B. Veblen’in Darvinci evrim yaklaşımını temel alarak ortaya koyduğu öncü çalışmalarla başlayan kurumsal iktisadın tarihsel serüveni, eski ve yeni kurumsal iktisat perspektifinden ele alınmıştır. Geleneğin önde gelen temsilcilerinin kurumları analize dâhil emek suretiyle iktisadi düşünceye yapmış oldukları katkılar ortaya konularak, insan davranışlarının iktisadi etkisine yönelik çalışmalara kurumsallaşmış davranış perspektifinden de bir kapı aralanması amaçlanmıştır. Buna ek olarak kurumsal geleneğin sürdürülebilmesine yönelik değerlendirmeler ele alınmış, günümüz hâkim iktisadi yaklaşım çerçevesinde söz konusu geleneğin avantaj ve dezavantajları vurgulanmıştır.

Keywords

• Kurumsal iktisat
• iktisadi düşünce
• iktisadi yaklaşımlar

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