ULUSLARARASI FİKRİ MÜLKİYET REJİMİNİN ÇARPIK MİMARİSİ VE AZ GELİŞMİŞ ÜLKELER İÇİN OLASILIKLAR

Yıl 2011, Cilt: 15 Sayı: 4, 25 - 63, 01.10.2011

Şeref Gökay Coşkun

Öz

Uluslararası fi kri mülkiyet rejimi uluslararası ekonomi hukuku alanındaki en sorunlu hukuksal rejimlerden birisidir. Bahse konu rejimin kuruluşu yüzyıldan daha uzun bir süre öncesine gitmesine rağmen, bu rejimin istikrarlı bir hukuk düzeni olduğu ve devletlerin büyük coğunluğunca kabul edildiği söylenemez. Ticarete İlişkin Fikri Mülkiyet Hakları Anlaşması’nin (TRIPS) uygulaması ve Anlaşma sonrasında imzalanan ikili, çok tarafl ı ve bölgesel ticaret anlaşmaları da az gelişmiş ülkeler ile gelişmiş ülkeler arasındaki uluslararası fi kri mülkiyet haklarının korunmasına ilişkin mevcut sorunları çözememiştir. Esasında, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTO) üyeleri arasında Doha Ticaret müzakerelerinde oluşan çıkmazın temel nedenlerinden birisi de tarafl arın bu hukuki rejime yönelik farklı tutumlarıdır. Uluslararası bir hukuksal rejim olarak fi kri mülkiyet sistemi tarafl ar arasında başlangıçta oluşan müzakere sorunlarından dolayı çarpık bir mimariye sahiptir. Bu alanda yeni bir hukuk rejiminin oluşturulması kısa ve orta vadede olası görünmese de TRIPS Anlaşmasının mevcut hükümleri kalkınma yanlısı bir şekilde yorumlanabilir ve az gelişmiş ülkeler tarafından TRIPS sonrası gelişmeleri şekillendirmek üzere yeni stratejiler benimsenebilir

Anahtar Kelimeler

Uluslararası fi kri mülkiyet hakları, TRIPS Anlaşması, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü, Doha Ticaret Müzakereleri, anlaşma yorumu.

DISTORTED ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME AND PROSPECTS FOR LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Öz

International intellectual property regime is one of the most problematic legal regimes in international economic law. Although its establishment goes back to more than one hundred years ago, it can not be argued that it is stable and accepted by the majority of the states. The implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the bilateral, multilateral and regional trade agreements signed in the post-TRIPS period have not been able to stabilize the ongoing problems between less-developed and developed countries on the international intellectual property protection. In fact, the discrepancies on this regime is one of the main reasons that caused the current stalemate in the Doha Round negotiations among the WTO members. As an international legal regime, intellectual property system has a distorted architecture mostly stemming from the initial bargaining problems between the parties. Although the establishment of a new regime is highly unlikely neither in the short nor medium term, existing provisions of the TRIPS can be interpreted through a more developmental way and new strategies can be adopted by less-developed countries to shape the post-TRIPS developments

Anahtar Kelimeler

International intellectual property rights, WTO, TRIPS Agreement, Doha Round negotiations, treaty interpretation

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