ÇOK KUTUPLULUK VE KÜRESEL YÖNETİŞİMİN FARKLILAŞAN BİÇİMLERİ

Öz

Bu makale, Amerikan tek kutupluluğunun zayıflamasının küresel yönetişimi yapısal, ideolojik ve kurumsal düzeylerde nasıl dönüştürdüğünü incelemektedir. Çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde büyük ölçüde ABD’nin maddi üstünlüğü ve liberal kurumsal liderliği etrafında şekillenen uluslararası düzenin, ekonomik, askeri, teknolojik ve normatif gücün yayılmasıyla daha parçalı ve tartışmalı bir yapıya dönüştüğünü savunmaktadır. Güncel veriler ve akademik literatürü kaynak alan makale, ABD’nin hâlâ önemli bir küresel güç olduğunu, ancak kuralları belirleme, koalisyonları yönlendirme ve çok taraflı kurumlar üzerindeki etkisini sürdürme kapasitesinin görece zayıfladığını göstermektedir. Yapısal düzeyde Çin ve diğer bölgesel aktörlerin küresel karar alma süreçlerinde daha fazla ağırlık kazandığı görülmektedir. Kurumsal düzeyde G20, BRICS, AIIB, bölgesel örgütler ve esnek mini-lateral iş birliklerinin yükselişi, küresel yönetişimin daha çoğulcu ve parçalı bir mimariye doğru ilerlediğini göstermektedir. İdeolojik düzeyde ise liberal normlar; egemenlik, kalkınma, müdahale etmeme ve farklı siyasal modellerin meşruiyeti gibi alternatif yaklaşımlar tarafından daha fazla tartışılmaktadır. Makale, küresel yönetişimin tamamen çökmekten ziyade, tek kutupluluk sonrası dönemde daha karmaşık, merkezi olmayan ve rekabetçi bir yapıya dönüştüğü sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• ABD tek kutupluluğu
• küresel yönetişim
• çok kutupluluk
• kurumsal parçalanma
• normatif mücadele

MULTIPOLARITY AND DIVERGENT PATTERNS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Öz

The article focuses on how the decline of U.S. unipolarity is reshaping global governance in the structural, ideological, and institutional dimensions. Research argument has constructed that the post-Cold War order, has provided American material dominance and liberal institutional leadership, has been transforming by the diffusion of economic, military, technological, and normative power. By utilizing recent data and scholarly literature, the article shows that the United States remains a major global power, still its capability for rulemaking, design and create coalitions, and dominate multilateral institutions has been weakened. From structural dimension, rising powers like China, and other regional actors have increased greater influence in global decision-making areas. Institutionally, the expansion of forums such as the G20, BRICS, the AIIB, and also mini-lateral coalitions, and regional organizations reflects a shift toward a more fragmented and plural governance structure. Moreover, ideologically, liberal norms have been increasingly contested by alternative norms based on sovereignty, development, non-interference, and political diversity. In this vein this article explains that global governance is not collapsing, rather becoming more decentralized, and contested in a post-unipolar international order.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• The U.S.
• global governance
• multipolarity
• institutional fragmentation
• normative contestation

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