LEVELS OF REASONING AND THEIR IMPACT ON UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM IN ETHICS

Öz

This article discusses psychologist Daniel Kahneman’s two systems of thinking in relation to the field of moral philosophy. According to Kahneman, while System 1 thinking is fast and intuitive, System 2 thinking is slow and reflective. However, the reason why we trust moral reflection over spontaneous moral intuition is not that the former is “slow” and the latter is “fast”, but rather that the reflective level introduces certain tools of rational criticism helping us distinguish between justified and unjustified moral judgements. This raises the further question whether critical reflection, aiming for truth and objectivity, might make us lose sight of more local moral values, such as loyalty to one’s family, friends, and political community. The conclusion of this article will be that it is indeed possible to outline a moral theory that is both justified at the level of critical thinking and that makes sense of particularist commitments.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Kahneman
• moral philosophy
• universalism
• particularism

Kaynakça

1. Aristotle. (1976). Ethics. London: Penguin Classics.
2. Bauhn, P. (2016). The Gewirthian Duty to Rescue. In P. Bauhn (Ed.), Gewirthian Perspectives on Human Rights (pp. 212–226). New York and London: Routledge.
3. Bauhn, P. (2019). Universalist Rights and Particularist Duties: The Case of Refugees. Migration Letters, 16(2), 145–153.
4. Brandt, R. B. (1979). A theory of the good and the right. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buchanan, A. (1991). Secession. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
5. Carens, J. (2013). The ethics of immigration. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Driver, J. (2007). Ethics: The fundamentals. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
6. Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Oxford Review, 5, 5–15. Frankena, W. K. (1973). Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
7. Gewirth, A. (1978). Reason and morality. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Gewirth, A. (1983). The rationality of reasonableness. Synthese, 57(2), 225–247.
8. Gewirth, A. (1984). Replies to my critics. In E. Regis Jr. (Ed.), Gewirth’s ethical rationalism (pp. 192–255). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Gewirth, A. (1988). Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy, 85(6), 283–302. Glover, J. (2012). Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press. Hare, R. M. (1981). Moral thinking. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hare, R. M. (1984). Do agents have to be moralists? In E. Regis Jr. (Ed.), Gewirth’s ethical rationalism (pp. 52–58). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

9. Harman, G. (1977). The nature of morality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
10. Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the principles of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
11. Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
12. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
13. Kant, I. (1964). Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals. New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks.
14. Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
15. MacIntyre, A. (1985). After virtue (2nd ed.). London: Duckworth.
16. Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics. London: Penguin Books.
17. Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
18. Noddings, N. (2003). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education (2nd ed.). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
19. Sharples, R. W. (1996). Stoics, epicureans and sceptics. London and New York, NY: Routledge. Singer, P. (1983). The expanding circle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20. Singer, P. (2016). One world now. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
21. Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. London: Fontana Press.