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UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZED CRIME FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 7 Sayı: 14, 147 - 171, 22.12.2020

Furkan Yıldız

Öz

Individuals, who are selfish in essence, act to maximize their own utility. This behavioral feature becomes functional when the potential benefit to be obtained by individuals, after making a cost-benefit calculation, is higher than the potential costs to arise. Economically, the "rational choice theory", which explains the basis of human behavior in this way, has become used for analyzing the participation of individuals in crime since the middle of the 20th century. In the light of the basic approach of this analysis, this study first evaluates the rational choice theory and examines the criminological interpretation of this theory. Later on, the study analyzes the definition of organized crime in the literature and international norms, which has been on the agenda of almost every state and supra-state organization. Since the study aims to analyze organized crime with the rational choice theory as its main purpose, it makes evaluations towards this purpose as a last step. Organized crime, whose primary purpose is to secure financial gain, is seen as an economic enterprise that commits a crime by considering the interests of the group or organization by evaluating it on a large scale, unlike the crimes committed individually. With these features, rational choice theory, which contains parts of many theories criminologically, has become the main approach for this study.

Kaynakça

  • Akdeniz, S., & Üzümcü, A. (2013). Suç ve sosyoekonomik değişkenler arasındaki bağımlılık ilişkisi: Kars Cezaevi üzerine bir inceleme. 4(6), ss.115-138.
  • Akers, R. (1990). Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The Path Not Taken. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 81(3), ss.653-676.
  • Akgüneş, A. O., & Aren, S. (2018). Dört Temel Duygunun Bireylerde Risk Alma Davranışı Üzerindeki Etkisi. Journal of Business Research - Turk, 10(3), ss.362-378.
  • Antunes, S., & Camisao, I. (2017). Realism. Içinde S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, & C. Scheinpflug (Ed.), International relations theory (ss. 15-22). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.
  • Beccaria, C. (2009). On crimes and punishments. United States: Seven Treasures Publications.
  • Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), ss.169-217.
  • Becker, G. S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. University of Chicago Press.
  • Becker, R., & Mehlkop, G. (2006). Social Class and Delinquency: An Empirical Utilization of Rational Choice Theory with Cross-Sectional Data of the 1990 and 2000 German General Population Surveys (ALLBUS). Rationality and Society, 18(2), ss.193-235.
  • Blackburn, K., Neanidis, K. C., & Rana, M. P. (2017). A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth. Economic Theory Bulletin, 5(2), ss. 227-245.
  • Bouffard, J. A. (2002). The influence of emotion on rational decision making in sexual aggression. Journal of Criminal Justice, 30(2), ss. 121-134.
  • Bouffard, J. A., & Wolf, K. (2007). Rational Choice Theory: A Crime-Related Perspective. Içinde G. Ritzer (Ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • Burke, R. H. (2014). An introduction to criminological theory (Fourth edition). London New York: Willan.
  • Burns, T., & Roszkowska, E. (2016). Rational Choice Theory: Toward a Psychological, Social, and Material Contextualization of Human Choice Behavior. Theoretical Economics Letters, 06(02), ss.195-207.
  • Buskens, V., & Raub, W. (2013). Rational Choice Research on Social Dilemmas: Embeddedness Effects on Trust. Içinde R. Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders, & V. Nee (Ed.), The handbook of rational choice social research (ss. 113-150). Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences.
  • Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (1985). Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework for Research and Policy. İçinde Crime and Justice (C. 6, ss. 147-185). Şikago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Clarke, R. V., & Eck, J. E. (2005). Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps. Washington: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing.
  • Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1986). The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending. Transaction Publishers.
  • Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1987). Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory. Criminology, 25(4), ss. 933-948.
  • Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (2002). Analyzing Organized Crimes. İçinde Alexis Russell Piquero & S. G. Tibbetts (Ed.), Rational choice and criminal behavior: Recent research and future challenges (ss. 41-62). New York London: Routledge.
  • Dahlbäck, O. (2003). Analyzing Rational Crime—Models and Methods. Hollanda: Springer.
  • Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why Social Preferences Matter—The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives. The Economic Journal, 112(478), ss. C1-C33.
  • Feld, S. L. (1981). The Focused Organization of Social Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 86(5), ss. 1015-1035.
  • Friedman, M., & Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in Positive Economics. Şikago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Giddens, A. (2009). Sociology (6th Edition edition). Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Gilmour, N. (2016). Understanding the practices behind money laundering – A rational choice interpretation. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, ss. 44, 1-13.
  • Goode, W. J. (1997). Rational Choice Theory. The American Sociologist, 28(2), 22-41.
  • Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), ss. 481-510.
  • Grasmick, H. G., & Bursik, R. J. (1990). Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model. Law & Society Review, 24(3), ss.837-861.
  • Gray, L. N., & Tallman, I. (1987). Theories of Choice: Contingent Reward and Punishment Applications. Social Psychology Quarterly, 50(1), ss. 16-23.
  • Green, S. L. (2002). Rational Choice Theory:An Overview. Baylor University.
  • Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2012). Paradoxes of Rational Choice Theory. İçinde S. Roeser, R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, & M. Peterson (Ed.), Handbook of Risk Theory (ss. 499-516). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
  • Güzel Özdemir, P., Tanhan, F., & Özdemir, O. (2018). Psikiyatride Rasyonel Seçim Teorisi. Psikiyatride Guncel Yaklasimlar - Current Approaches in Psychiatry, 10(4), ss. 484-495.
  • Hardin, R. (2001). Rational Choice Explanation: Philosophical Aspects. Içinde N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (ss. 12755-12760). New York: Elsevier.
  • Harding, R. W. (1990). Rational-choice gun use in armed robbery: The likely deterrent effect on gun use of mandatory additional imprisonment. Criminal Law Forum, 1(3), ss. 427-450.
  • Hirschi, T. (1986). On the Compatibility of Rational Choice and Social Control Theories of Crime. İçinde D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Ed.), The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (ss. 105-118). New York: Springer.
  • Hochstetler, A. (2010). International Dynamics in Robbery and Burglary Groups. Içinde P. F. Cromwell (Ed.), In their own words: Criminals on crime: An anthology (ss. 46-66). New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Homans, G. C. (1961). Social Behavior; Its Elementary Forms. Harcourt: Brace & World.
  • Iannaccone, L. R. (2016). Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion. Içinde L. A. Young (Ed.), Rational Choice Theory and Religion Summary and Assessment (ss. 25-44). Londra: Routledge.
  • Kızmaz, Z. (2005). Sosyolojik Suç Kuramlarının Suç Olgusunu Açıklama Potansiyelleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme. Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 29(2), ss. 149-174.
  • Kleck, G., Sever, B., Li, S., & Gertz, M. (2005). The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research. Criminology, 43(3), ss. 623-660.
  • Kleemans, E. R. (2013). Organized crime and the visible hand: A theoretical critique on the economic analysis of organized crime. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 13(5), 615-629.
  • Kleemans, E. R. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime. İçinde L. Paoli (Ed.), Theoretical Perspectives on Organized Crime (ss. 32-53). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Lampe, K. von. (2016). Organized crime: Analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures and extra-legal governance. Los Angeles London New Delhi Singapore Washington DC: SAGE.
  • Lampe, K. von, & Johansen, P. O. (2004). Organized Crime and Trust: On the conceptualization and empirical relevance of trust in the context of criminal networks. Global Crime, 6(2), ss. 159-184.
  • Loughran, T., Paternoster, R., & Weiss, D. B. (2015). Deterrence. Içinde Alex R. Piquero (Ed.), The handbook of criminological theory (ss. 50-74). Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Lyman, M. D. (2019). Organized crime. New York: Pearson.
  • Matsueda, R. L. (2013). Rational Choice Research in Criminology: A Multi-Level Framework. İçinde R. Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders, & V. Nee (Ed.), The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research (ss. 283-321). California: Stanford Social Sciences.
  • McCarthy, B., & Chaudhary, A. (2014). Rational Choice Theory and Crime. İçinde G. Bruinsma & D. Weisburd (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice (ss. 4307-4315). Londra: Springer.
  • Mehlkop, G., & Graeff, P. (2010). Modelling a rational choice theory of criminal action: Subjective expected utilities, norms, and interactions. Rationality and Society, 22(2), ss. 189-222.
  • Nagin, D. S., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime. Law & Society Review, 27(3), ss. 467-496.
  • Paoli, L., & Beken, T. V. (2014). Organized Crime: A Contested Concept. Içinde L. Paoli (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of organized crime (ss. 13-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Patermoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1993). A Rational Choice Theory of Corporate Crime. Içinde R. V. G. Clarke & M. Felson (Ed.), Routine Activity and Rational Choice (ss. 37-58). New Brumswick: Transaction Publishers.
  • Paternoster, Ray, Jaynes, C. M., & Wilson, T. (2017). Rational Choice Theory and Interest in the “Fortune of Others”. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 54(6), ss. 847-868.
  • Paternoster, Raymond, & Simpson, S. (1996). Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime. Law & Society Review, 30(3), ss. 549-583.
  • Pires, S. F., Schneider, J. L., & Herrera, M. (2016). Organized crime or crime that is organized? The parrot trade in the neotropics. Trends in Organized Crime, 19(1),ss. 4-20.
  • Sampson, R. J., & Groves, W. B. (1989). Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94(4),ss. 774-802.
  • Sattler, S., Graeff, P., & Willen, S. (2013). Explaining the Decision to Plagiarize: An Empirical Test of the Interplay Between Rationality, Norms, and Opportunity. Deviant Behavior, 34(6), 444-463.
  • Scott, J. (2000). Rational Choice Theory. İçinde G. Browning, A. Halcli, & F. Webster (Ed.), Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present (ss. 126-138). Londra: SAGE Publications Ltd.
  • Selman, A., & Uçar, R. (2011). Dini Tercihleri Anlama ve Açıklamaya Farklı Bir Yaklaşım: Rasyonel Seçim Teorisi. Toplum Bilimler, 5(11), ss. 91-110.
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RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 7 Sayı: 14, 147 - 171, 22.12.2020

Furkan Yıldız

Öz

Özünde bencil olan insan, kişisel faydasını maksimize etmek için hareket etmektedir. Bu davranışsal özellik, bireylerin fayda maliyet hesaplaması yapmasının ardından elde edeceği potansiyel faydanın, doğacak potansiyel maliyetlerden yüksek olduğu zaman işlevsellik kazanır. İktisadi olarak, insan davranışlarının temelini bu şekilde açıklayan “rasyonel seçim teorisi” 20.yy’ın ortalarından itibaren bireylerin suça katılımını da analiz eder hale gelmiştir. Bu analizin temel yaklaşımı ışığında, bu çalışma, öncelikle, rasyonel seçim teorisini değerlendirmiş ve bu teorinin kriminolojik yorumunu incelemiştir. Daha sonra çalışma, yerel boyuttan küresel boyuta geçen ve hemen hemen her devletin ve devlet üstü örgütün gündemine girer hale gelen organize suç konusu ile ilgili literatürdeki ve uluslararası normlardaki tanımlarını analiz etmiştir. Çalışma, asıl amaç olarak organize suç konusunu, rasyonel seçim teorisi ile analiz etmeyi hedeflediğinden son adım olarak bu amaca yönelik değerlendirmeler yapmıştır. Temel amaçlarının başında, finansal kazanç elde etmek olan organize suç, bireysel işlenen suçlardan farklı olarak, büyük ölçekli olarak değerlendirerek grubun veya örgütün menfaatlerini gözeterek suç işleyen iktisadi bir girişim olarak görülmektedir. Bu özellikleriyle, kriminolojik olarak birçok teorinin parçalarını içinde bulunduran rasyonel seçim teorisi, bu çalışma için temel yaklaşım haline gelmiştir. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rasyonel Seçim Teorisi Kısmi Rasyonellik Organize Suçlar Kriminoloji

Kaynakça

  • Akdeniz, S., & Üzümcü, A. (2013). Suç ve sosyoekonomik değişkenler arasındaki bağımlılık ilişkisi: Kars Cezaevi üzerine bir inceleme. 4(6), ss.115-138.
  • Akers, R. (1990). Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The Path Not Taken. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 81(3), ss.653-676.
  • Akgüneş, A. O., & Aren, S. (2018). Dört Temel Duygunun Bireylerde Risk Alma Davranışı Üzerindeki Etkisi. Journal of Business Research - Turk, 10(3), ss.362-378.
  • Antunes, S., & Camisao, I. (2017). Realism. Içinde S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, & C. Scheinpflug (Ed.), International relations theory (ss. 15-22). Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.
  • Beccaria, C. (2009). On crimes and punishments. United States: Seven Treasures Publications.
  • Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), ss.169-217.
  • Becker, G. S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. University of Chicago Press.
  • Becker, R., & Mehlkop, G. (2006). Social Class and Delinquency: An Empirical Utilization of Rational Choice Theory with Cross-Sectional Data of the 1990 and 2000 German General Population Surveys (ALLBUS). Rationality and Society, 18(2), ss.193-235.
  • Blackburn, K., Neanidis, K. C., & Rana, M. P. (2017). A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth. Economic Theory Bulletin, 5(2), ss. 227-245.
  • Bouffard, J. A. (2002). The influence of emotion on rational decision making in sexual aggression. Journal of Criminal Justice, 30(2), ss. 121-134.
  • Bouffard, J. A., & Wolf, K. (2007). Rational Choice Theory: A Crime-Related Perspective. Içinde G. Ritzer (Ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • Burke, R. H. (2014). An introduction to criminological theory (Fourth edition). London New York: Willan.
  • Burns, T., & Roszkowska, E. (2016). Rational Choice Theory: Toward a Psychological, Social, and Material Contextualization of Human Choice Behavior. Theoretical Economics Letters, 06(02), ss.195-207.
  • Buskens, V., & Raub, W. (2013). Rational Choice Research on Social Dilemmas: Embeddedness Effects on Trust. Içinde R. Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders, & V. Nee (Ed.), The handbook of rational choice social research (ss. 113-150). Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences.
  • Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (1985). Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework for Research and Policy. İçinde Crime and Justice (C. 6, ss. 147-185). Şikago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Clarke, R. V., & Eck, J. E. (2005). Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps. Washington: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing.
  • Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1986). The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending. Transaction Publishers.
  • Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1987). Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory. Criminology, 25(4), ss. 933-948.
  • Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (2002). Analyzing Organized Crimes. İçinde Alexis Russell Piquero & S. G. Tibbetts (Ed.), Rational choice and criminal behavior: Recent research and future challenges (ss. 41-62). New York London: Routledge.
  • Dahlbäck, O. (2003). Analyzing Rational Crime—Models and Methods. Hollanda: Springer.
  • Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why Social Preferences Matter—The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives. The Economic Journal, 112(478), ss. C1-C33.
  • Feld, S. L. (1981). The Focused Organization of Social Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 86(5), ss. 1015-1035.
  • Friedman, M., & Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in Positive Economics. Şikago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Giddens, A. (2009). Sociology (6th Edition edition). Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Gilmour, N. (2016). Understanding the practices behind money laundering – A rational choice interpretation. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, ss. 44, 1-13.
  • Goode, W. J. (1997). Rational Choice Theory. The American Sociologist, 28(2), 22-41.
  • Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), ss. 481-510.
  • Grasmick, H. G., & Bursik, R. J. (1990). Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model. Law & Society Review, 24(3), ss.837-861.
  • Gray, L. N., & Tallman, I. (1987). Theories of Choice: Contingent Reward and Punishment Applications. Social Psychology Quarterly, 50(1), ss. 16-23.
  • Green, S. L. (2002). Rational Choice Theory:An Overview. Baylor University.
  • Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2012). Paradoxes of Rational Choice Theory. İçinde S. Roeser, R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, & M. Peterson (Ed.), Handbook of Risk Theory (ss. 499-516). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
  • Güzel Özdemir, P., Tanhan, F., & Özdemir, O. (2018). Psikiyatride Rasyonel Seçim Teorisi. Psikiyatride Guncel Yaklasimlar - Current Approaches in Psychiatry, 10(4), ss. 484-495.
  • Hardin, R. (2001). Rational Choice Explanation: Philosophical Aspects. Içinde N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (ss. 12755-12760). New York: Elsevier.
  • Harding, R. W. (1990). Rational-choice gun use in armed robbery: The likely deterrent effect on gun use of mandatory additional imprisonment. Criminal Law Forum, 1(3), ss. 427-450.
  • Hirschi, T. (1986). On the Compatibility of Rational Choice and Social Control Theories of Crime. İçinde D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Ed.), The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (ss. 105-118). New York: Springer.
  • Hochstetler, A. (2010). International Dynamics in Robbery and Burglary Groups. Içinde P. F. Cromwell (Ed.), In their own words: Criminals on crime: An anthology (ss. 46-66). New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Homans, G. C. (1961). Social Behavior; Its Elementary Forms. Harcourt: Brace & World.
  • Iannaccone, L. R. (2016). Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion. Içinde L. A. Young (Ed.), Rational Choice Theory and Religion Summary and Assessment (ss. 25-44). Londra: Routledge.
  • Kızmaz, Z. (2005). Sosyolojik Suç Kuramlarının Suç Olgusunu Açıklama Potansiyelleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme. Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 29(2), ss. 149-174.
  • Kleck, G., Sever, B., Li, S., & Gertz, M. (2005). The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research. Criminology, 43(3), ss. 623-660.
  • Kleemans, E. R. (2013). Organized crime and the visible hand: A theoretical critique on the economic analysis of organized crime. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 13(5), 615-629.
  • Kleemans, E. R. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime. İçinde L. Paoli (Ed.), Theoretical Perspectives on Organized Crime (ss. 32-53). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Lampe, K. von. (2016). Organized crime: Analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures and extra-legal governance. Los Angeles London New Delhi Singapore Washington DC: SAGE.
  • Lampe, K. von, & Johansen, P. O. (2004). Organized Crime and Trust: On the conceptualization and empirical relevance of trust in the context of criminal networks. Global Crime, 6(2), ss. 159-184.
  • Loughran, T., Paternoster, R., & Weiss, D. B. (2015). Deterrence. Içinde Alex R. Piquero (Ed.), The handbook of criminological theory (ss. 50-74). Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Lyman, M. D. (2019). Organized crime. New York: Pearson.
  • Matsueda, R. L. (2013). Rational Choice Research in Criminology: A Multi-Level Framework. İçinde R. Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders, & V. Nee (Ed.), The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research (ss. 283-321). California: Stanford Social Sciences.
  • McCarthy, B., & Chaudhary, A. (2014). Rational Choice Theory and Crime. İçinde G. Bruinsma & D. Weisburd (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice (ss. 4307-4315). Londra: Springer.
  • Mehlkop, G., & Graeff, P. (2010). Modelling a rational choice theory of criminal action: Subjective expected utilities, norms, and interactions. Rationality and Society, 22(2), ss. 189-222.
  • Nagin, D. S., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime. Law & Society Review, 27(3), ss. 467-496.
  • Paoli, L., & Beken, T. V. (2014). Organized Crime: A Contested Concept. Içinde L. Paoli (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of organized crime (ss. 13-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Patermoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1993). A Rational Choice Theory of Corporate Crime. Içinde R. V. G. Clarke & M. Felson (Ed.), Routine Activity and Rational Choice (ss. 37-58). New Brumswick: Transaction Publishers.
  • Paternoster, Ray, Jaynes, C. M., & Wilson, T. (2017). Rational Choice Theory and Interest in the “Fortune of Others”. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 54(6), ss. 847-868.
  • Paternoster, Raymond, & Simpson, S. (1996). Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime. Law & Society Review, 30(3), ss. 549-583.
  • Pires, S. F., Schneider, J. L., & Herrera, M. (2016). Organized crime or crime that is organized? The parrot trade in the neotropics. Trends in Organized Crime, 19(1),ss. 4-20.
  • Sampson, R. J., & Groves, W. B. (1989). Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94(4),ss. 774-802.
  • Sattler, S., Graeff, P., & Willen, S. (2013). Explaining the Decision to Plagiarize: An Empirical Test of the Interplay Between Rationality, Norms, and Opportunity. Deviant Behavior, 34(6), 444-463.
  • Scott, J. (2000). Rational Choice Theory. İçinde G. Browning, A. Halcli, & F. Webster (Ed.), Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present (ss. 126-138). Londra: SAGE Publications Ltd.
  • Selman, A., & Uçar, R. (2011). Dini Tercihleri Anlama ve Açıklamaya Farklı Bir Yaklaşım: Rasyonel Seçim Teorisi. Toplum Bilimler, 5(11), ss. 91-110.
  • Shaw, C. R., & McKay, H. D. (1942). Juvenile delinquency and urban areas. Şikago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Smith, D. C. (1980). Paragons, Pariahs, and Pirates: A Spectrum-Based Theory of Enterprise. Crime and Delinquecy, 26(3), ss. 358-386.
  • Spence, K. W. (1956). Behavior theory and conditioning. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Tewksbury, R. (2014). Organized Crime Theories. İçinde J. M. Miller (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Theoretical Criminology (ss. 1-4). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • Tilley, N. (2012). Crime prevention. New York: Routledge.
  • Tittle, C. R., Antonaccio, O., Botchkovar, E., & Kranidioti, M. (2010). Expected utility, self-control, morality, and criminal probability. Social Science Research, 39(6), ss.1029-1046.
  • UN General Assembly. Naples Political Declaration and Global Action against Organized Transnational Crime. , Resolution 49/159 § (1994).
  • UNODC. (2015). Defining Organized Crime. Erişim tarihi: 21 Ağustos 2020, https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-1/key-issues/defining-organized-crime.html
  • van Duyne, P. C. (1993). Organized crime markets in a turbulent Europe. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 1(3), ss.10-30.
  • Vlasis, D. (2002). The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. İçinde M. Berdal & M. Serrano (Ed.), Transnational organized crime and international security: Business as usual? (ss. 83-94). Londra: Lynne Rienner Pub.
  • Walters, G. D. (2015). The Decision to Commit Crime: Rational or Nonrational? Criminology, Criminal Justice Law & Society, 16(3), ss.1-18.
  • Wikström, P.-O. H., & Svensson, R. (2010). When does self-control matter? The interaction between morality and self-control in crime causation. European Journal of Criminology, 7(5), ss.395-410.
  • Wittek, R. (2013). Rational Choice Theory. Içinde R. J. McGee & R. L. Warms (Ed.), Theory in social and cultural anthropology: An encyclopedia (ss. 688-689). Los Angeles: Sage Reference.
  • Wong, S. K. (2012). Youth crime and family disruption in Canadian municipalities: An adaptation of Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization theory. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 40(2), ss.100-114.
  • Wrigt, V. (2010). Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment. Erişim tarihi: 24 Ağustos 2020, Sentencing Project website: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf
Toplam 74 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Tüm Sayı
Yazarlar

Furkan Yıldız 0000-0003-1533-222X

Yayımlanma Tarihi 22 Aralık 2020
Gönderilme Tarihi 8 Eylül 2020
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2020 Cilt: 7 Sayı: 14

Kaynak Göster

APA Yıldız, F. (2020). RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK. Akademik Hassasiyetler, 7(14), 147-171.
AMA Yıldız F. RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK. Akademik Hassasiyetler. Aralık 2020;7(14):147-171.
Chicago Yıldız, Furkan. “RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK”. Akademik Hassasiyetler 7, sy. 14 (Aralık 2020): 147-71.
EndNote Yıldız F (01 Aralık 2020) RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK. Akademik Hassasiyetler 7 14 147–171.
IEEE F. Yıldız, “RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK”, Akademik Hassasiyetler, c. 7, sy. 14, ss. 147–171, 2020.
ISNAD Yıldız, Furkan. “RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK”. Akademik Hassasiyetler 7/14 (Aralık 2020), 147-171.
JAMA Yıldız F. RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK. Akademik Hassasiyetler. 2020;7:147–171.
MLA Yıldız, Furkan. “RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK”. Akademik Hassasiyetler, c. 7, sy. 14, 2020, ss. 147-71.
Vancouver Yıldız F. RASYONEL SEÇİM TEORİSİ İLE ORGANİZE SUÇLARI ANLAMAK. Akademik Hassasiyetler. 2020;7(14):147-71.
 Kapak Resmi İndir

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