ŞİRKET ELE GEÇİRMELERİNE KARŞI GELİŞTİRİLEN SAVUNMA TAKTİKLERİ: KAVRAMSAL BİR İNCELEME

Öz

Son zamanlarda şirket ele geçirmeleri bir şirketin kontrolünü sağlama ve yönetimini değiştirmede kullanılan yaygın bir araçtır. Ele geçirme, bir şirketin, diğer bir şirketin yönetiminin ya da ortaklarının istekleri dışında, şirket üzerinde kontrol ve mülkiyet elde etmek amacıyla hisse senetlerinin satın alınmasıdır. Şirketler arası birleşmeler her zaman tarafların karşılıklı anlaşması ve isteğiyle gerçekleşmemektedir. Ele geçirilmek istenen hedef şirketin yönetimi buna karşı çıkabilir. Hedef şirketin yönetimi bu girişimleri önlemek için ele geçirme teklifi öncesi ve sonrası olmak üzere temel olarak iki çeşit savunma taktikleri geliştirebilmektedirler. Bu çalışmanın amacı; şirketin ele geçirilme girişimlerini bertaraf etmeye yönelik şirket bünyesinde geliştirilen ele geçirme teklifi öncesi ve sonrası savunma taktiklerini ilgili literatürü dikkate alarak teorik olarak ortaya koymaktır. Kullanılan taktiklerin bir arada sunulduğu çalışmaların yeterli düzeyde olmayışı bu çalışmanın çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışmada öncelikle ele geçirme kavramı ve ele geçirmenin amaçları ayrıntılı olarak irdelenmiştir. Daha sonra ele geçirme girişimlerine karşı geliştirilen ele geçirme teklifi öncesi ve sonrası savunma taktikleri ele alınmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

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Kaynakça

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