Agency Theory: A Review in Finance

Yıl 2020, , 1323 - 1329, 24.08.2020

Hasan Tekin , Ali Yavuz Polat

https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.712351

Cited By: 3

Öz

Temsil ve risk paylaşımı problemleri büyük firmalarda sahiplik ve kontrolün ayrılmış olmasından dolayı, müvekkil (sahipler) ve vekil (yöneticiler) arasında çıkar çatışması olduğunda ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu problemler temel olarak bilgi asimetrisinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu da müvekkil için vekalet maliyeti ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Halihazırdaki önemli teorilerden biri olan Vekil Teorisi vekalet ilişkilerindeki maliyetleri minimize etmeye odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma müvekkil-vekil ilişkilerini daha iyi anlamak için, kurumsal finans alanındaki hissedar-yönetici ve tahvil sahibi-hissedar ilişkilerine odaklanarak, müvekkil-vekil ilişkilerini kritik bir şekilde değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Agency Theory, Capital Structure Decisions, Corporate Finance

Vekalet Teorisi: Finans Alanında Bir İnceleme

Öz

The problems of agency and risk sharing arise due to the separation of ownership and control of a large firm, when conflicts of interest exist between principals (owners) and agents (managers). The main source of these problems is asymmetric information, which implies an agency cost for the principal. Agency theory, which is still one of the fundamental theories in corporate finance, focuses on minimizing costs in agency relations. This study critically evaluates the principal-agent relations, focusing on the interaction between the shareholder-manager and bondholder-shareholder in corporate finance.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Vekalet Teorisi, Sermaye Yapısı Kararları, Kurumsal Finansman

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